The Avlah Of Ones & Mefateh - The Rambam's Jurisprudence - Rav Josh Kaufman

So the topic I want to you know speak about is uh what is the AA of ones um particularly with a Rambam centered analysis that there is something wrong with onat's unequivocal the question is what wrong is the Torah addressing not what wrongs might exist in the abstract But what wrong this law itself is built to address? I'm asking this question because the law is extraordinarily narrow. We all know from learning this perman. It's tempting, as it is to many, to to read this as the Torah's general approach to rape law, but that framing uh is possibly mistaken. We may or may not be able to construct a sweeping legal theory of rape. Even if such a theory were possible, the Torah here deliberately limits its prescription to a specific, targeted, and narrow case. Whatever one takes the wrongdoing of rape to be in general could be violation of consent, physical or psychological harm, right? A sort of trauma, mere objectification of the woman or you know something else. Any one of those elements apply no less exanti to other women than to anula. Yet the law of onhat is limited exclusively to her. So the proper methodology as it probably is in all cases is not to situate the Torah's law within the universal Jewish prudence of rape but to reconstruct inductively and from within how the Torah itself conceptualizes the law it articulates. like this you know that's where we begin and it's it's really where we must always begin as Ben Torah as Torah. So right what is the abla expressed by the law of onat with that methodological framing in place the first place to test it is the question of consent ordinarily the father is the rights holder in both on and the offender whomever he is answers to him he gives it to the father of the girl but what happens when the daughter herself holds the rights, right? Most clearly in the case of Sugio, we discussed we discussed many of these subtopics that we're weaving together here for, you know, a broader um philosophy of these laws. Case of Muta is where there's consent and no father whose rights could be invoked. What happens in such a case? Given that consent is present and there's no father, only the girl, what, if anything, remains of the Torah's claim against the offender in Mifhat? Before turning to the positions, I must make a point um by stating it plainly. In most legal systems, once genuine consent is established to be present, the wrongdoing largely disappears. Whatever remains may be morally troubling, but it's no longer legally legally actionable. Some legal theorists, especially the radical um you know, feminist um you know, legal philosophers make a living out of um questioning whether real whether presented consent is real consent. But once again consent is agreed upon as being authentic and genuine again by and large the the um the offense goes away. However allows us to ask a striking question even where consent is fully present. Did something happen? >> Oh the best angle. >> Okay. We have a group of and videographers really it's very talented. Right? So there's the striking question um that we can ask in the even where consent is fully present even where there's no father and the girl is the sole party does the Torah still recognize in a in the very fact again that the question can be asked already signals that the Torah may be working with a conception of wrongdoing that isn't exhausted by consent or harm alone. the Ramban on the one hand and the USI as read by the on the other. Right? Those two authorities are separated historically by quite a distance. But the Ramban and thei as the reads it have two different interpretations which are really fundamentally different approaches to what the is of of oness in Moshe Siml argues that if we understand the unique 50 shekel of as a form of a response to personal injury or loss. Then consent functions here exactly exactly as it does elsewhere in the law of damages. Just as pagam, right? Bosches, pagam and s according to everybody. According to every authority, pashas, the gimar, according to everybody, those three personal injury payments fall away when the sole rights holder consents. Right? Right? If she consents here as autism, everybody agrees those payments are not in order. So if you look at also as a form of theas too would fall away. And once the loss would be authorized by the victim, there's no remaining injury for the law to redress. When dealing with tors and personal injury, the whole point for those payments, the mak of those payments, if you will, is to redress loss. It's all about rights. Rights that are violated, consent works and there should be no. So is that what on is the Raman gives us a almost resounding yes. Right? As we know in some text it's printed on Raman basically says that consent neutralizes the wrong. He has a language where he says the he compares the case of a mafuta again. She's the only interest um in the in the picture. Father's not around. He compares it to tearing someone's garment with permission or breaking their jug also with uh per permission. And what the rim seems to be getting at, whether you understand it like the or we did um a little bit differently at the time, is that in such a case where the woman again is the only person involved and she gives her consent to the offender, there's no there's no liability here whatsoever. The den on as it were ceases to exist. Whatever Ones um fat was coming to address her consent erases it and wipes it away completely. It's as if whatever that was didn't really happen. That's how he explains why he is potter. That doesn't mean that the offender and this is important is excused from all moral culpability. But it does mean that the one for which the law of ones um fat comes anchored in personal loss falls by the wayside for the Ramban. On um emerges as a subcategory of nikim in this case but as it turns out it's how the Ramban treats on consistently. He's constantly invoking the paradigm of dema that it's just a specialized instance of personal injury. I'll list them and just allude to them as those of us in the room hopefully know what I mean. the Ramban on the nature of the damages paid. The reason why normally they get paid to the father perhaps his position on low si alisha being not a one-time obligation to marry her but a mitzvah that con that persists is if the is that the mitzvah of loia is not about marriage which would be a one-time thing but punishing the aggressor and safeuard regarding this oh so vulnerable victim. Indeed the garment comparison is kusi is borrowed from which gimar? The gimar which is not said of alas the way the raan implies it. said in particular reference to Tsar. Sar again classic of Kabala but also only paid if ever in onus. Rabi Shimon thinks that nobody pays but that analogy only appears in the context of and it isn't obvious that it would extend beyond it. The Ramban's expansion from the paradigm into even the law of reinforces the Nazikan element that I think one can easily detect by reading the Rambanita throughout the par. That's the Rama the on the view is in many ways the very opposite perspective of the Rambali in Gimmel Zion is explicit that in the case of Mafuta Yoma there's no against the simple reading of the Bavi, not the only reading of the Bavi, but the greatly prevalent view of the Bavi, which is that Mafia does not get again the reason why not is exactly the debate. But against again the standard very standard view of the bavi the usual is clear that the mafhata actually has to pay the girl mafuta theas she's not able to forgive it remains even with consent as the usi writes she cannot be redbaz explains ains the rationale of the us why not the money's coming to her after all why does the maf have to pay it so says remarkably remarkably because the offense is not really hers it's between the and the so who is she not not hers to be according to me. Again, she receives the money. She's the recipient of the money, but not in response to harm or loss done to her, but because of what he did. The redbaz gives an analogy an analogy which will become relevant very soon when we transition to the second part of the you understand my reference at the time and it'll be fun to be able to say we mentioned it you know on the eve before the year turned the analogy is eating truma if an cohen fan eats truma bisho gig He's obligated to pay money to the coin right now is to pay for eating truma for violating Allah Allah were a very serious law the is Mishna says in trumos that the coen who's even though he's receiving the money cannot be mo he cannot forgive the zar from being obligated to pay. He can't forgive the Zar for being obligated to pay. But the Cohen's the one getting the money, isn't it? His isn't the reason he's being paid for him? No. That's exactly the point. Even though the coain's the recipient of the money, the zar's obligation is to shi the response to the isser of against eating truma is to pay to a cohen. But the violation is violation has nothing. There's no loss that you caused to the cohen. It wasn't the cohen's money previously that desire was taking away from him. maybe indirectly but it wasn't his it was the but he did the so too says is the payment of the onus she might be the recipient of the money but she's not the source of the violation and then the ribbas goes on to incorporate the den of ones with other isabia. It's an amazing he says as follows. Now the reason for the law for Michano. The wrong is not done to her but through her. Reva we mentioned before 173 also argues that the special is not a redress to orid it differs from standard or nazikin. But what is it? So he says several times a very loaded and yet vague phrase for the sin or transgression of the beia and the defilement defiling the narula. I'll be honest with you I'm not sure how to pinpoint exactly what he's trying to identify. End of the day Mosha was a post. He also wasn't necessarily trying to express you know what exactly the wrong was. It seems to me if anything he was trying to cast a broad net like to include you know more than one there could be more than one problem with the ones um in light of this and Mosha I want to diverge for a moment also to raise that raises an important question we're not going to answer it but it's important that we know it it's especially problematic for the who connects OS and which is where is the biblical prohibition to be found for talking about it as some sort of a like we would expect to find some sort of prohibition of prohibition that's unique to on not just a way of subsuming ones in some other pre-existing prohibition like los or loia kadesha for the rama but what if any is the prohibition for is there one what is it and if there's not what is what do we make of it and what does that tell us if we're not just going to based off of that reject this other perspective. We need to step back and reframe the question in a more basic terms. The tension that we've seen until now is real and very fundamental. What kind of law is ownus in plain and simple? Is this a specialized case within Zikin, a law of injury, loss, monetary redress, albeit an unusual one for sure? Or is it instead an expression of Iser and ishus, a religious moral norm governing sexual relations and the Torah's conception of family and marriage. [snorts] The ambiguity is already expressed and reflected in the Torah itself. In para's mishbatim the law appears of in this case among civil laws of property and tors the evanzra in his comment to the puk that begins compares the ptoy done to the girl stealing her heart like stealing someone's money. On the other hand, we also encounter it in paras. This time speaking about oness appearing alongside laws of marriage, sexuality and relational obligations. The arayos are not so far away. The mitzvah of kushian well some of them at least the kushian iboom. So the question presses itself is on um a law of damages that happens to involve intimacy or a law about intimate relations that happens to employ monetary mechanisms. With the framing in place, I think we can now ask how the Rambam understands the nature of this law. The Ram treats on um as a self-contained system. And clearly not a variant of tort law. He codifies it in safer nashim noter following rebias right who puts these laws in rather than in and say rather than but the rama making the choice to do so is really an act of conceptual work. By doing it, I think the Ram wants to tell us something that the cork is not injury or loss, but something bound up with ishas. When the Ram decides to place something somewhere, we're never allowed to see it. We must not see it. Just as neutral, but as interpretation. Ram is giving us interpretation based on how he chooses to classify and categorize. It's true. He's following what Revi does. But you can say that he's preserving the maybe that Revi is coming to suggest what is the Ram doing by putting it there within which is the name he gives for the laws of math itself. Two other choices stand out that I want to highlight. Number one is the mitzvah's formulation. We'll start with that. The Ram counts two mitzvah for on he says the mitzvah is lick knows how in the that's what he writes and in mitzvos and the miner as well for oness what does he say >> close Lisa on s anuso I should say that the Rambam's description here is extremely counterintuitive. Number one, the Torah is more explicit about and on meat is only derived there from only after we know the payment from the by on the Garins and says we compare Mat to Oness. Moreover, like moral intuition suggests that a rapist deserves the fine more than the seducer. We'll all remember the subluh which describes the oness's payment and the meat's payment differently. How so? It calls what the ones pays and what the maf pays py on as many of the there just pick up on it's just a gim. If you don't change the gear so the are just picking up on it sayas and ptoy because ones commends more than meat. And yet despite these two points, the Rambam attaches to Matate rather than onus. And he emphasizes marriage in onus. And he does this consistently everywhere not just in the as well if whatever it is about the marriage as well emphasizes the onus. It's a story I told the first kabur that we had that about 11 years ago I was learning suis uh at the same time that while you was learning yes was learning suis which is where I was at the time and as a young boy I you know I was really gripped by this problem in the Rambam how exactly the Rambam you know why he did this just seems so counterintuitive and instead of you know and on doesn't even tell you about my own like what exactly is going on and it troubled me for weeks like everybody I had any person who I would want to answer from that I could possibly ask I would ask if there came to visit as he as he always does and I slotted myself in for a time we sat with and the first thing I had to ask him said you know the yeshiva is learning su what's shot with this rah I asked him the question he looked at me I was waiting so exced excited like he's going to give me this amazing answer. Here's the galador. At the time I didn't know, but he gave me his signature answer. I don't know. I was to say the least very frustrated. But this is the question. This is the question. The Ramba. But I think the answer is that it's not, you know, something the Ram glossed over an omission. Ram is trying to tell us something that in oness marriage is the defining response. Everything else which the oness has to undertake is just subsumed or expressed by the marriage obligation. And in mate where marriage is structurally weaker or there may for the Ram there is no mitzvah. There's no obligation for the mafhat to marry to marry her. He can and he won't have to pay but he doesn't have to marry her. So in where marriage is structurally weaker best expresses the Torah stance. The Ramom is moving. What I'm trying to say is that the Ramom is moving from the special unique payments of oneshat to redefine everything else that is within it. The best way to capture the myths of ones is by accentuating what is unique about it. Not the other payments of not even the maybe the most unusual of them is the mitzvah of Nis and in the for the Rambam I don't think like some suggest the ones which is not doesn't seem to be explicit I don't think it's like some say it's subsumed in the that he says for I think on is the and is the but whereas says in on the MS nuin encapsulates the ram's perspective towards ones is what does that in we'll continue to explain this but that's I think what the raom does in the structure and organization of the as well this is the second point chapter one in deals with only two obligations the and marriage And remember there's only two chapters in all of chapter one. All the Rama mentions is marriage. What's striking is what's missing. There's no bes no these only appear in chapter 2. But even when they come up there they're secondary. Ram says by the way in addition to the like don't think that there isn't something else. We have to tell you there's something else. There's also Basagam and in the case of Oness there's Tar. So what is the effect of the Rambam's organization? Again a very conceptual one. I think the Ram's telling us what the law is, the nature of the law before telling us what else follows from it. Raam following Rebi again who also put first rebi only mentions in the Mish as the kubetas points out and only later in the Mishnayas in our in it's do even hear of the payment the Ram is using to define the category Basamsar just to address the residual consequences which again is why he spotlights in on the perspective reaches its sharpest expression in Bud where the Rambam introduces what seems really to be his own very novel legislation. Ram says, says the Rambam that even boam and S are owed only to those women who fall within the Torah's category of anyone excluded from kass like a divorcee a convert an islandist they're all excluded from those payments as well and the mafarim really struggle to embrace this the tour objects even if there's no class well why should that affect liability for humili iliation, depreciation or pain. The insists that at minimum this should revert to the law of and even the Mishna the Rambam's greatest defender concedes you hear the desperation but for the Rambam I think the answer is consistent The payments are not independent tor damages that merely accompany the offense. They are internal components of the special law of tofos's lang language. But to push further iskushes up, they're defined by derived from and limited by the framework itself. The unique law of ones um fat does not merely add special penalty penalties to ordinary injury, but it redefineses what constitutes the wrong in the first place when we're within this legal framework already. So then even seemingly generic damages are reconstituted according to its own logic. Which explains why throughout chapter two in all of them each has a based on the perspective that the Rambam treats these payments in ways different from that of general tort law. What emerges then is a striking jurist credential claim. Oness um are not about harm alone but about a violation of a Torah defined ideal of ishas. The legal response is therefore not exhausted by the compensation of injury as such but is oriented towards and here it is. It's oriented towards preserving, even reasserting the sanctity and meaning the Torah assigns to marital relationships. KNAS and marriage give direct expression to that goal. Bes, pagam and sar function perhaps only within that normative frame. The remaining question though of course is the deepest one. We now need to ask what constitutes that ablah in the Rambam's view beyond what can be inferred from the structure and placement alone. Unlike the Rambos, the Rambam largely avoids framing the qu the offense in terms of consent which would have been helpful methodologically to help us figure out what kind of problem he thinks it is. So his silence makes it hard to anchor his perspective in in das in consent which is actually the ram doesn't really speak about it all that much which is a difficulty that remains troubling to me doesn't really speak about um the role of the mafuta yoma um so much but you know the main commentators assume that a woman's authorization for the rambom is not like the ramban it does not eliminate any legally recognizable cognizable wrong and even where there is no father whose rights are implicated. Instead of consent, I think the Rambam assigns an outsized and unexpected role to the yes. within the laws of through the I think the Rambam shapes the meaning of the the function of the marriage obligation and the nature of the ALA this body comes of law comes to address because we're surprised to find here something native to ordinary Jewish marriage that we're learning about in the morning playing such a central role in the laws of oneshat Let's take a concrete case. When a meat marries the woman, the Torah tells us that marriage eliminates the 50 shakas. But that raises an obvious question which is what happens to the Ram's answer is striking and every word matters here. Rambam writes in [snorts] by Mufuta she her father and the Mata himself all agree Imratu the kansa they all won and he marries her analas he doesn't pay but instead of the coba he writes her kisharulus He pays her like Shah Habasulus. The Rambam seems to rule that she receives auba of 200 kimar habasulos like all other all other virgins which is remarkable. At the time of the marriage she's a bulah. Ordinarily that would mean that she gets 100. And Tossus and the Ridid explicitly say that. Why should she get 200? Why should she get 200? But it's so much more than that. The Ram doesn't just say that she gets 200. He insists on the formulation. He could have said she gets auba of 200. But what does he say? Like all other basulos. I think because the den itself is that you're required to see her as a visa. As Moenu of Rosen has suggested, the Rambam uses kuba here to address the very wrong of Mata and by extension of oness. To see why we need to recall what Kuba does in Jewish marriage. Kuba, which obviously practically at its core provides her financial security, is not really just a financial safety net. It actually gives marriage weight, seriousness, and consequence. Right. Shalom. Shouldn't be easy for him to divorce her. Certainly functions as a deterrent to casual divorce. A kind of last ditch effort before he pulls the trigger trigger. But more deeply, its financial stakes give the marriage from the beginning a certain kind of weight. They make intimacy consequential nor casual but serious and not disposable. The fact that right is payable only after the marriage ends capture captures its essence. It represents a commitment that outlives desire utility and even the relationship itself. Without auba we're arguing you haven't merely failed to pay money but to define the marriage properly. That's why the Ram defines the mitzvah of marriage itself in terms of in the ishas right he writes the mitzvah there's a mitzvah and this is exactly what on violate they're the antithesis of reliance reciprocity dignity and commitment they take intimacy and strip it of responsib possibility much like though I insist not identical to the Rambam's prohibition of Kadesha which the Rambam defines as intercourse without and kaducin on meat represent a corruption of the very institution of Ishas an emboldened requirement then is not just an added detail it's the perfect response to the onus it forces the offender to restore weight consequence and moral seriousness where he tried to avoid them by treating her as any other basis. The law is in effect rolling back the clocks the clock restoring her to the marriage that she was always entitled to. She's now met with responsibility with consequence and commitment. In the case of ones, that commitment takes the extreme form of perhaps the fullest expression of shala of because in that sense the perpetual marriage itself may even obiate the need for exuba. But here's the deeper point. The Rambam's language that is not only the response to the wrong. It's the key to understanding the 50 shekelas itself. For the Ramub and are two expressions of a single idea, one within marriage, one outside of it. And this is not really the Ram's innovation. Kazal already note that the 50 shekel equals the value of a 200 kuba and the gar even derives the itself from according to the view that is from the verses of ones and kimarulos. It also explains something that can be easily overlooked which is why do these laws appear in kubis at all? Why is onus inubus? But I think it's because they express a shared principle for the ra then is effectively obligation outside of marriage a way of forcing responsibility and commitment where the offender is trying to evade them. And it's precisely this equation that the Ramban Alatra and the Rivid resist because for them Kas belongs to Nazikin, not Is. And with that framework in place, we can finally return to a troubling gimmar. [clears throat] It's bothered me the whole year until I was quickly preparing between Sunday and now to try to give us a way of reflecting on the year to kind of thread um you know thread a string between a lot of the stuff that we've done. There's a serious challenge uh if we frame kas the way we have been because the gimmar itself actually asks what the kas is for. We should look at it probably. Morales quotes the defeat the abaya. I meant rightas [snorts] of 50. is for the affliction the trauma abay grounds the enoi harm right trauma or affliction which fits naturally with a certain you know kind of moral reading of understand that but rabba says something startling is none. The 50 shekels is for the pleasure of lying of but and as we know So what does that mean? Is this payment for pleasure? Is that what the Gar is saying? We ought to deal with this. I'm making all these claims. Is that all it is? It's a gimar pay for 50 shackles for some maybe the toasak in and certainly I think the kilis have taken have taken it that way. Mosha in that chuva responds critically um to also to somebody who interprets the gimar this way as well. They really say that it's dehana as if the pleasure itself was like being priced. The same way if a person would hire themselves out for beia it's exchange that really all it is. It's hard for that to be right though. If this were a payment for benefit, would it really be a Would it have the DM of No, it would be Mama wouldn't be and there also it'd be so hard to understand why we'd limit this payment to Naira bas like the Han is different or non-existent. In other cases, if it's quid proquo in exchange of goods or benefits so many rishonim are uncomfortable over here. Rashi in Babakama actually emphasizes the abay instead of raas. He often speaks about the kas as for the enoi for the pain the trauma which obviously coaleses with a more rambanlike if we just have to be you know strict about it a more ramban like view but again he's he's basically giving you know putting rava out on the street for the tour actually reformulates rava Torah says that the which is beautiful. The is for the which has all of the the religious moral connotations you could want. But Raa didn't say that. The Ram does neither inf says after by the way discussing the already for a whole chapter he preserves rabba's language. So what is another way of understanding rabba? I think Rava is not speaking about pleasure as compensation but about corrupt pleasure seeking like Abay. Rava understands Kas as responding to a moral wrong but the focus is different. Abay emphasizes what was done to her the harm the trauma whereas Rava emphasizes what he did with desire itself. This was Han's pleasure taken selfishly, instrumentally on his own terms. It's desire severed from responsibility. He's paying because of because how he went about the and he's paying for that for the intimacy basically without kidushin but even more even worse even more corrupt and this is where I think the raom's broader conception of marriage becomes even more crucial for the Rambam the very foundation of marriage is rat is true will. When a man and a woman enter into ishas, it has to be the meeting of two wills. Not persuasion, not pressure, not willbounding. The Ram opens the entire book of Nashinishas with the formulation of both of them almost reciprocally, you know, in unison expressing the same level of will. Even though the man initiates and courts and proposes, right, the man has to take and not the woman. Marriage is only created when there is genuine convergence of will where there's real affinity between the partnersh and mutual ascent in Isus in the Ramb may even be raising the bar for what counts as consent especially on the woman's side more than any of the other is in this sense as much as any other ones and are the antithesis of Jewish marriage. They're not merely harmful acts, but they're a corruption of desire itself. It's a extracted without mutual without reliance and respect and responsibility. I think that's what Ra is pointing to and why the Rambam chooses to preserve that language. So the kas is not a payment for pleasure but a penalty for the degradation of desire for turning what should be an expression of shared roone into an act of exploitation. This may be too subtle, but it dawned on me even if you want to reject a nazikin approach to onat and you wouldn't want to put the laws in safer nazikin but in nim at large there is still a choice that the ram is left with in s kaduca there'sia which is 22 chapters that detail all of the many prohibitions relating to via it's where I think the would have put the laws of on the Ram is markedly different from the in ways which in which we've already demonstrated but I think his decision to include it specifically in safer nashim now that we've said all of this not on it alone but now that we've said all of this is very telling right what's in safer nashim the mitzvah of kadushian all that is in they're all mitzvah of marriage. Zam himself actually calls them all mitzvah shall be about the fabric of the institution. Even sot right is where there's a breakdown in the marriage relationship. What is on doing here? And if you're just going to tell me, oh, because there's a mitzvah to marry her, loa, it definitely could be. And even though there's a mitzvah for kangad to marry vasula and that's inia, not here. You just say because that's where he talks about the laws of kohanim who kanim can marry maybe. But I wonder it's because the raam is exactly saying that what nar bisula is is a corruption of the institution of marriage itself. There are several other phenomena from a Rambam perspective that can be more clearly understood within this orientation. I'll just list them as I am starting to conclude. Such as his decision to place these laws within safer nashim specifically like I just said that he names the section and accentuates the narula persona in the mo and actually in the Torah they speak about how the narula is like the most omade for marriage. They speak about it more pragmatically, but I wonder if there is something to be said about that also again about the corruption of the Torah principles of marriage. It also explains the omission or exemption of a gentile victim which again it seems to be a rashi and if a non-Jewish girl is the is the victim of such a crime with all the other conditions in place except she's not Jewish versus Jewish what about that Ram never talks about that but what would the conclusion that we would draw be and also I think even the Ram it would be an interesting take on the obscurity uh or an obvious source for there being any biblical prohibition. How the Rambam would deal with that if there is none, why that would be. But for all of that really, I'll just say one more thing before I actually just make a concluding remark, which is that it behooves us to all appreciate if this is in fact the perspective of the Rambam what I said from the very outset that it's impossible merely to see or merely to look at the of as in conversation with how law at large other systems and cultures, other legal systems, how they might talk about rape or different kinds of it. For the Rambam, if we're right, the wrong, the AA of on is internally Jewish. It's an expression of an already particularistic approach to the marital union. Something reserved even from the standpoint intrajewishly only Jews have gaish. So all the very things that all those institutions come to promote in terms of kadusha the sanctity of ishas and marriage that we're saying is ravaged by ones on expresses the a very Jewishly specific and again there may be other things that are common other things happening in the particular case where there is a benu At the end of the day, the primary wrong the way I'm establish approach to marriage. It's a function of the Jewish approach to marriage for the Rambam. Again, the love of is not exhausted by harm, injury, or even the absence of consent. Although they may be present, I'm not totally dismissing that they're there at all. Well, it's a violation of the Torah's conception of ishas itself. Marriage as the Rambam understands it is founded on rats and the genuine meeting of two wills sustained by suba which gives intimacy weight and permanence that makes a relationship something which you can't easily walk away from like the ones who the equivalent metaphorically of a hidden run on represent the categorical negation of that ideal. which is really pleasure taken without mutual will. It's a type of intimacy stripped of obligation and someone who's pursuing desire really in defiance of isas spitting in the face. So are therefore not compensatory mechanisms but expressive ones. They force responsibility where it's refused and serious where it's denied. The law does not merely respond to what was done. It really restores what was desecrated. And this in fact is the Rambam's resounding and remarkable answer to what is the ALA of ones um this was a tremendous man of learning of seeing suga collecting it each topic rigorously analytically thoughtfully Y carefully and then ultimately after everything is done to organically without even straining too much right we were able to do all this what in a couple days just reflecting basically on everything that we've learned then trying to zoom out after focusing laser focused in on all the sugas whenever we learn really the goal is to try again to build things peace meal to build things again with rigor with integrity and also with a conceptual focus. But then when you're able to put all the things together and run the needle through. So what emerges um is a very comprehensive and rich um perspective towards Jewish law. Uh and in our case really the avla the wrong of uh the den of ones we'll continue after the year in the next man with the rest of uh kim. Thank you.