Putin's 1st Invasion, The Russo-Georgian War 2008

The time is 11:30 p.m. on the 7th of August, 2008. In the breakaway region of South Oetia, an eerie stillness has overtaken the capital city of Skin Valley. After a week of escalating tensions, armed clashes have once again broken out between the south Asetians and the country of Georgia after years of sectarian violence. Multiple Georgian military servicemen have been killed in the past week and Georgian tanks along with artillery have been massing on the border with South Oetia. Now the tension appears to be easing. 4 hours earlier, Georgian President Mikuel Sarash Villi announced a unilateral ceasefire in the region and many civilians in Skin Bali hope the violence will begin to subside. A civilian in the city, Kaspc Gilv will later describe what happened when the clock ticked past 11:35 p.m. We were listening to Sarash Villi who was saying that he agrees on any negotiations. We felt comfortable. I was drinking tea and suddenly I heard explosions. The house shook. The roof exploded. A steel rain of artillery shells, rocket munitions, and high explosive tank rounds begin falling indiscriminately across the city and its surrounding villages. Georgia is about to launch an offensive to reclaim what it believes is its rightful sovereign territory. But this will not be an easy task. It will have to go through South Oetia's small military and its northern neighbor, Russia. The ensuing war will be Europe's first large-scale conflict of the 21st century and the dawn of a new age of Russian expansionism. [music] The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the 13th century when the Kingdom of Georgia located in the Caucusus region, the area between the Black and Caspian seas was at the height of its power. The small Christian kingdom experienced rapid expansion under the rule of Queen Tamar the Great following the collapse of the Byzantine and Seljuk empires. This is Professor Steven Jones, the founding director of the program on Georgian Studies at Harvard University and the author of Georgia, a political history since independence. Part of the problem was the dynasty of the Bationi kings were very fruitful and they produced many sons and daughters who then fought over the kingdoms and fought among themselves. And so you never really saw the reunification of the Georgian kingdom. >> Splintering into smaller independent kingdoms left Georgia vulnerable, which was then attacked by their powerful southern neighbors, the Ottoman and Persian empires. With the remnants of Georgia besieged by enemies, the local kingdoms had no choice but to seek a protector. There was only one option, the Russian Empire. In 1783, the largest of the local Georgian kingdoms, the Kingdom of Kardley Kaketi signed the Treaty of Georgiesque, which established eastern Georgia as a protectorate of Russia. >> Historically, if you look at Russia's diplomatic relations, it's it's obviously like I guess all great powers in the 19th century, you couldn't really trust them. Despite the 1783 Guggie's treaty, which created a protectorate status, decided that they would enex Georgia. And in 1801 they did so. So Cartel Kaheti was the first kingdom to be annexed in 1801. And then for the next 60 years the Russian Empire chipped away at at all the other Georgian mini kingdoms and by the 1860s the entire territory of Georgia was part of the Russian Empire. >> One minority within Georgia resisted the new occupation. a nomadic collection of tribes called the Asetians. Beginning in the 8th century, the Asetians gradually migrated north from Persia into the Caucasus region where they established independent settlements within the Kingdom of Georgia. When Georgia was annexed into Russia in 1801, the Asetians initially refused to submit [music] to Russian rule. It would take until 1830 for a Russian military expedition to fully conquer Oetia and subjugate the population. The relationship between Tsarist Russia and the new Caucus' subjects was tense throughout the 19th century. The Georgian people were mostly poor peasants. Yet the central government in St. Petersburg levied high taxes against them and Georgians were forcibly conscripted into the imperial army. The Zars also undertook Russification measures much like they did in other formerly independent territories such as Ukraine. Occasional revolts against Russian rule were crushed and many of the locals were forced into surfdom including Asetians. The Senetti uprising of 1875 to 1876 was again crushed by the Russian military, but the emergence of new social classes and the abolishment of the surfom system created a new wave of nationalism. It wasn't really until the 1860s and the 1870s under the influence of European movements of national liberation that Georgians began to think of themselves as an oppressed minority in the empire that should have at least autonomy if not independence. Although independence was a word that was rarely used in the 19th century by Georgian nationalists. What they were aiming for was greater self-government. And much of the rebellion in the 1860s, '7s, 80s was intellectual, ideological. The 1905 revolution that rocked Russia also found its way to Georgia. Sensing an opportunity to secure more autonomy, the Georgian and Oetian peasants rose in revolt against the Russian government. The revolution was more important for the social democratic labor party and its two main factions, the moderate Menchevik block and the radical Bolsheviks. The Menchevik faction was dominant in Georgia, but young Bolshevik revolutionaries such as Joseph Stalin began their rise to fame in 1905. The revolution in Georgia was eventually crushed by 1907, but the experience laid the groundwork for the menvikled independence movement who now waited for the right moment to finally break away from Russia. That moment came in 1917 with the overthrow of Zan Nicholas II and the October Revolution which brought the Bolsheviks to power in Russia. The Georgian Mencheviks rejected the Bolevik central government and declared independence proclaiming the Democratic Republic of Georgia in May of 1918. This is Professor Ronald Grigor Sunni, professor emeritus of history and political science at the universities of Michigan and Chicago and author of the nation the making and faking of nationalisms. So what's interesting is during the Menchik period from 198 to two groups were more probik and critical of the Menchevik than any others and they were the Abkas and the Oatines. There were resentments and anxieties among those small minorities about Georgian dominance. And so even in the revolutionary years they revolted and were eventually repressed by the Georgians because they wanted they felt closer to Russia and closer to the Boleviks and their main fear was dominance of Georgians. >> However, this moment of triumph for the Georgian independence movement also provided the spark for the south Asetian conflict. The Asetians living in Georgia tended to be poor and landless which led them to identify more with the hardline Bolsheviks who were more aggressive in pursuing land reform. The conflict between the two sides was not just ideological in nature as the class struggle in the Caucus' region fed ethnic tension between the Asetians and the Georgians. It wasn't until the 20th century really uh that that relationship became a conflictual one. I would say at the time of the first Georgian republic 1918 to21 you first began to see these conflicts between Asetians and Georgians. But up until then the relationship really had been reasonably peaceful. The Asetians launched a series of revolts against the Georgian government between 1918 and 1921. And although they were all defeated, Moscow would soon turn its attention to the Caucuses following the communist victory in the Russian Civil War. In February of 1921, the Bolsheviks launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia with the local aid of the Asetians, who cut communications lines and joined local uprisings against the Georgians. Georgia was quickly subdued and annexed into the Soviet Union, becoming the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic or GSSR. As a reward for helping the Bolevik takeover of the country, the South Asetian Autonomous Oblast was created within the borders of the GSSR, which gave the Asetians a degree of local autonomy. However, the creation of an autonomous South Asetian region greatly complicated local relations, and the resulting animosity would simmer for years. During Stalin's long reign from roughly 1928 to 1953, Stalin emphasized Georgianness and the Abhas and the Oatines felt very repressed during that period. That would change after Stalin's death when they would insist on reasserting their national claims. Yet ethnic relations in the Caucasus region had mostly cooled by the 1980s as both the Asetians and Georgians lived next to each other in relative harmony. This began to change as rising nationalism shattered the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s. The revived independence movement within Georgia greatly concerned local leaders in South Asetia. Many South Asetians believed Georgia would launch a campaign of ethnic cleansing in their region and began to take measures to fight back. The Asetian nationalistic organization Adam Nikas which translates to voice of the people was created in the late 1980s to counter Georgian nationalism and petition Moscow for protection. On the 10th of November 1989, the South Asetian Supreme Soviet Council formally asked the government of the GSSR to grant them the status of autonomous republic. The application was denied and pro-Georgian protests sprang up in Skinvali to denounce separatist tendencies. Tensions rose further over the next 2 years as the Soviet Union disintegrated. In a desperate attempt to keep the empire and its vassal states together, the government of general secretary Mikuel Gorbachev began openly funding separatist movements within wavering Soviet subjects. Gorbachev warned the Georgians that Moscow would openly side with South Asetia if Georgia left the Soviet Union. The South Asetians were not the only minority group threatening to break away from Georgia. In the small Black Sea province of Abcasia, old tensions were beginning to resurface. Under Stalin, ABCIA had been downgraded from a republic to an autonomous region within Georgia, a change many abcasians viewed as a betrayal. Decades later, as Gorbachev's reforms loosened Moscow's grip, the question of who truly ruled Abcasia returned with force. In March of 1989, thousands of abcasians gathered near the village of Likny to demand the restoration of Abcasia's status as a full Soviet republic separate from Georgia. Georgian nationalists saw this as a direct challenge to their territorial integrity and demonstrations turned violent. In July, ethnic clashes broke out in Sukumi, the capital of Akcazia, located on the Black Sea coast, leaving at least 16 people dead and hundreds wounded. Independence was seen as inevitable by the summer of 1990 when Georgia was preparing to hold free parliamentary elections for the first time since 1919. Hoping to circumvent the October elections, South Asetia declared state sovereignty on the 20th of September 1990 and held their own elections in December of that year. The new Georgian government led by Zad Gans Sakuria retaliated by passing a law that abolished South Oetia's autonomous status. A state of emergency was declared in South Asetia as peace unraveled. In January of 1991, Georgian militia men and national guard were ambushed by armed rebels in Skinvaling, which kicked off a 3-week urban battle for the city. Georgian forces later withdrew as part of a larger ceasefire, but instituted an economic blockade on South Oetia. On the 9th of April 1991, Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union after an overwhelming victory in a referendum where 98% of Georgians voted for independence. A month later, South Oetia announced it would separate from Georgia and rejoin Russia. Dortmund President Zad Gans Sakuria initially showed restraint in negotiating with the South Asetians and a joint commission was formed to finally determine which country South Asetia belonged to. However, the 1991 August coupe which nearly toppled Mikuel Gorbachev also led to the dissolution of the joint commission in Tibi. Georgia's capital and largest city Gordia ruled with growing authoritarianism. His crackdown on descent split the country and by December of 1991 civil war erupted in the capital. By early 1992, Gamsordia was forced into exile and former Soviet foreign minister Edward Chevard Nadi took control of the fractured nation. In South Asetia, separatists armed by Moscow clashed with Georgian troops in a bitter guerilla war that left hundreds dead. A Russian brokered ceasefire took effect in 1992. The same year, Georgian forces entered abcasia to reassert control, but instead triggered another sectarian conflict. With covert Russian support, Abkar's militias pushed the Georgians out of Sukumi, the capital city of Abcasia in 1993. Following the end of the war in both breakaway regions, peacekeeping operations largely under the control and influence of Russia were set up in both Abcasia and South Asetia. Georgian troops were used as peacekeepers in South Asetia in addition to local forces and Russians. The peacekeeping operations continued until the beginning of the 2008 war. And in Georgia in particular, the 1990s was characterized by serious internal conflicts and civil war. It wasn't really until the mid 1990s that one can argue that Georgia stabilized as a state. Up until then, it had clearly been a failed state between 91 and 95. By the mid 1990s, Georgia had survived civil war but lost both Accazia and South Oetia. Independence had come at a terrible cost. A country sovereign in name but divided in reality. By the end of the decade, Georgia had achieved a fragile peace. But the wars in Abcasia and South Asetia were frozen at their front lines, hardened into political boundaries. Relations between the neighbors were somewhat restored in the late 1990s, but the underlying tension never left. What began as a struggle for independence had fragmented the state itself, leaving Georgia's future tied to unresolved questions of sovereignty and loss. By the early 2000s, the ceasefires that ended the wars in Abcasia and South Asetia had hardened into uneasy stalemates. For more than a decade, Georgia lived divided as a country, haunted by loss, yet unwilling to surrender its claim to unity. In 2004, the bloodless Rose Revolution forced President Shad Naz to resign, which finally ended Soviet era leadership in Georgia. The following election saw a strident pro-Western politician, 36-year-old Male Sarash Villi, assumed the presidency. The young and fiery Sarashbilly immediately moves to strengthen the Georgian government, instituting reforms, curbing corruption, revitalizing the economy and increasing the military budget. So Mikail Sakishi was elected president and at first he was very interesting guy. He ended a lot of the corruption in the country and Georgia seemed well on its way toward democracy in that period. But he was anxious to get back not only Araia, not only Tossetia, but also Aaria. There was a little autonomous region called Aaria which was under the control of a local lord. So Sarak Philly successfully got rid of this guy Abash and um took over Aaria and now Russia did not complain that was already put in time. Promising reform and reintegration, many Georgians saw a second chance to finish what independence had begun. Their expectations only grew when Sarashvilli successfully reintegrated the breakaway region of Ajara back into the country within 2 months of his inauguration, spurring hopes that Abcasia and South Asetia would soon be returned to Georgia. But in Moscow and in the separatist capitals of Sukumi and Skinvali, Sarash villi's rhetoric was seen as a threat. Old lines of division began to stir once more. By the summer of 2008, Georgia stands at a crossroads. To many in the Georgian capital of Tlisi, it feels as if Georgia is being tested by their Russian neighbors. To the Kremlin, Zarashi's western turn threatens the old balance of power in the Caucuses. By August of 2008, the two nations are locked in a slow spiral of escalation and the mountains of South Asetia will become the fault line of a new European war. It's quite possible that the events which will eventually lead to the Russo Georgian war began in early 2008. On the 17th of February, the Balkan region of Kosovo declares independence from Serbia and immediately aligns itself with the United States and NATO. However, this embrace of Kosovo is seen by Moscow as an invasion of Russia's sphere of influence. Serbia has historically been one of Russia's closest allies and President Dmitri Medvidev along with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin protest Kosovo's independence as a gross violation of the UN charter and UN Security Council resolution 1244 which had recognized Serbia's territorial integrity. More importantly, Russian officials warned that Kosovo will set a dangerous precedent for other separatist regions, including Abcasia and South Oetia. A month after Kosovo's announcement, Russia renews economic ties with abcasia and strengthens its military presence in the region. Meanwhile, Georgia is eagerly pursuing President Sarash Villi's main foreign policy goal, NATO membership. In April of 2008, the nation's delegation arrives at the NATO summit in Bucharest [music] in Romania with high hopes. The United States pushes hard to grant Georgia and Ukraine a membership action plan, a formal step towards joining the alliance, but key European members b at the proposal. To Sarakash villi, Bucharest is a mixed bag. Georgia leaves without an invitation to NATO but remains firmly on the path to future membership. However, Sarash Villi returns to Tlisi under the mistaken assumption that NATO will come to his country's aid in any confrontation with Russia. To Russian Prime Minister Putin, the NATO summit is proof that Georgia's Western ties are a threat worth confronting, and Putin intends to test NATO's resolve in the caucuses. At 8:00 a.m. on the 1st of August 2008, a Toyota Hilux pickup truck carrying five Georgian police officers is rocked by a sudden explosion while patrolling a deserted road to the north of Skinvali. Despite the separation between Georgia and South Asetia, there are dozens of villages with majority Georgian populations within South Asetia, and it is common for Georgian police officers to patrol inside the territory. A quick investigation reveals that an improvised explosive device was used to attack the policemen, and Georgian authorities have little doubt that South Asetian separatists are to blame. Later that day at 6:17 p.m. they launched their retaliatory response. Snipers of the Georgian Interior Ministry Special Task Force opened fire on South Asetian border checkpoints, killing four border guards and wounding seven. Heavy clashes break out across the region as the conflict escalates. Two more people are killed and a further 22 wounded on the night of the 1st to the 2nd of August, marking the deadliest day in the conflict since 2004. The following day, the South Asetian government begins evacuating women and children from Skinvali and the villages along the border with Georgia. The Russian peacekeeping force is put on high alert at five bases within Skinvali, including a large and vulnerable southern compound that straddles the border between South Asetia and Georgia. Small engagements between Georgia and South Asetia continue over the next 3 days while highlevel deliberations take place in Moscow and Tlisi. President Male Sarcastle has spent years itching for a confrontation with Russia and isn't about to let this opportunity slip through his fingers. On the afternoon of the 6th of August, Sarashfilly orders the general staff to prepare an offensive to take back control of South Asetia, cenamed Operation Clear Field. The Georgian army goes on high alert and two infantry brigades along with armor and artillery are moved close to the border on the evening of the 6th of August. A plan is quickly drawn up to encircle and capture Skinvali within 8 hours of the start of the offensive. The Georgian president notes he is taking a massive risk invading the breakaway region, but decides he will never get a better chance to retake South Asetia. Sarashilli is well aware that Russia will likely support the South Asetians, but is gambling that his military will be able to quickly subdue the separatists before Russian military forces can intervene. He hopes to present Moscow with a fatal componable for the Russians to pursue more escalation. However, he is still operating under the dangerous assumption that the United States and NATO will come to his country's aid should his plan fail. In fact, Sarash Villi is falling right into a Russian trap as Vladimir Putin has been hoping that Georgia would make the first move in the caucuses. Behind the scenes, Moscow has been encouraging South Asetia to launch escalatory attacks on Georgian communities near the border in order to draw Georgia into a conflict it cannot win. When Sarcastle makes his move, the Kremlin will claim it is acting in self-defense by intervening on behalf of South Asetia. Assigning responsibility for the outbreak of the war is a highly contested and controversial topic. Even to this day, many still disagree on the causes and whether long and short-term factors are more important to understanding why war broke out. Many blame both sides. The European Union's report on the war noted that overall the conflict is rooted in a profusion of causes comprising different layers in time and actions combined. While it is possible to identify the authorship of some important events and decisions marking its course, there is no way to assign overall responsibility for the conflict to one side alone. They have all failed and it should be their responsibility to make good for it. Academics have differing opinions over who was responsible for the outbreak of war in August of 2008, including those who we interviewed for this podcast. Professor Ronald Grigors Sunni believes Georgia is responsible for starting the war. >> Why do I think that it was Sar Kushili who started the war and not the Russians? Because the Russians were perfectly satisfied with the status quo before August 2008. They were south of the caucuses. They had a foothold in Abcazia and Southia. It was Zakish really which wasn't who wasn't happy with that status quo and wanted to change it and so Zakish really launched an artillery barrage on his own people let's say remember this is considered part of George but it was a an autonomous part and it was the Russians were there and he sends he started the war even telling that story that it was Sakisi who started the war can get you into trouble because most people don't understand this. The Russians were slightly caught off guard uh and they had to react and they reacted and and so forth. I made a very careful chronology of the events leading up to the war and you can see provocations on both sides. This one would shoot down a helicopter, that one would do this, this and that and so forth. So people will make claims, oh the Russians provoked the invasion, but you could see both sides maneuvering and Putin trying to in fact in some ways prevent it disintegrating or escalating into war because he had no motivation to really change the the status quo. He was in a good position. He had other things to think about. But Sakis really was was anxious to change it and used the opportunity that he found in in that August days to do it. So I would put it that way. But you know, people can argue about it, but to claim that Russia started the war, that it's part of a pattern of Russian imperial aggression and so forth, these are things necessary for demonizing Russia, which is a very popular thing in the West. In contrast, Professor Steven Jones believes that the responsibility lies with Russia. >> As to who started the war, I think you have to keep in mind that the Russian Georgian relationship leading up to 2008 was very tense. And it wasn't as if this suddenly appeared this war. It was the result of longstanding conflicts [music] between Georgia and Russia from the period of shipped Nazi in fact but it intensified under Sarus really because of his pro-western aspirations and Russia got very anxious about this so it was going to teach Georgia a lesson Georgia was looking more and more like an outpost of NATO to Russians Russia's south on its southern borders so it was a security issue too for Russia. The 2008 war really was not about Russia and Georgia. It was really about Russia reestablishing its imperial presence and warning the West that Russia was back and that it had the power and the strength to [music] reassert its influence in Eurasia. So Georgia was in some sense a guinea pig I think in 2008 and it was easy for Russia to invade Georgia. We now know that Russia had planned this war a long time before August 2008 when they invaded. You can't just suddenly launch a military invasion, [music] you know, within a few days. This was months in the planning. It was a deliberate Russian strategy. The Georgians were totally unprepared for this war. Their most important and well-trained division was in Iraq at this time. And they couldn't participate in the defense of Georgia. The training that Georgians were receiving from NATO was defensive in nature. They weren't training the Georgian army to be a an effective sort of attack force. That was not the role that NATO saw for Georgia at this time. They wanted Georgia to participate in NATO operations, but more uh you know as as a defensive um strategy rather than as a as an one of attack. >> The Russian military has already drawn up plans to defend the region by rushing reinforcements down the Transcaucus' highway and through the Roki tunnel 30 mi north of Skinvali. The Russians have left 1500 men in two reinforced battalions from the 19th Motor Rifle Division just 18 mi from the Roki tunnel entrance. These units along with a battalion tactical group of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division are on 24-hour alert, ready to move into South Asetia once the Georgian offensive begins. Plans for a widespread aerial bombing campaign have also been distributed to Russian air forces near the border. Georgian intelligence is forecasting that it will take 4 days for the Russian military to gather sufficient forces to respond to operation clear field. In reality, the Russians are already less than 24 hours from the combat area. The Georgian government begins evacuating civilians from the villages near the border on the 7th of August while announcing partial mobilization of reserveists. At 2 p.m., a Georgian BMP2 infantry fighting vehicle is struck by a mortar round and explodes, killing two and wounding seven inside. For Sarashilli, this is the last straw. He orders Operation Clear Field to begin the following morning. At 3:45, Georgian units open fire on the south Asetian village of Gitakurui using self-propelled guns and tanks. An hour later, the remaining Georgian peacekeepers still in Skinvali slip out of the city and return to Georgian lines. President Sarash Villi declares a unilateral ceasefire at 7:36 p.m. But this is mostly for show. Meanwhile, dozens of Georgian tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, and heavy mortars along with both rocket and tube artillery assemble close to the border. At 11 p.m. the deployment is complete. War is now inevitable. At 11:35 p.m. on the 7th of August 2008, more than 100 heavy mortars, artillery pieces, and multiple launch rocket systems, better known as MLRS, open fire on Skinvali. 122 mm, 152 mm, and 203 mm tube artillery batteries and BM21 Grand Rocket artillery lob high explosives at the city. The original plan had been to only target key strategic locations within Skinvali, but the accuracy of the artillery fire is poor, showering residential neighborhoods and military targets alike. Some shells land to the north of the city, exploding in the majority Georgian enclave of villages. By dawn, large parts of Skinvali are burning. The southern Russian peacekeeping compound is hit, a provocation Georgia was specifically hoping to avoid. In response, the Russians activate their contingency plans, and the two reinforced battalions along with tanks and artillery begin moving towards the Roki tunnel. At 1:00 a.m., Operation Clear Field is commanded by Major General Zazar Goggava, who has set up his headquarters in the city of Gory, 16 mi to the southeast of Skinfall. Altogether, Major General Gagava has 16,000 men at his disposal. 12,000 from the Georgian Army and 4,000 from the Interior Ministry, which includes special forces and police units. The Interior Ministry forces along with the tank company will storm Skinvali while bypassing the Russian peacekeeping compounds stationed in the city. The army's two mechanized brigades are the strongest units involved in the offense and have the most important task breaking through South Asetian defenses to the east and west of Skinbali before encircling the city. The third infantry brigade will attack the prey heights to the east of the city and storm the villages of Demenissi and Satakari. Meanwhile, the fourth brigade will capture the key village of Kidakarovi to the west before heading north. Both brigades will meet at the town of Diddi Gupta and close off the Roki tunnel, therefore preventing Russian reinforcements from moving south. While the Russian rapid response forces are driving hard for the Roki tunnel, at 1:00 a.m. the Georgian ground offensive commences. Artillery fire shifts to the west where the fourth infantry brigade launches their assault on Kadakarovi. The village is a vital location as the cornerstone of the Zaskaya road, a highway built by the South Asetians to connect Skinvali to the main thoroughfare leading into Russia. It serves as a detour route around the Georgian enclave villages, allowing the South Asetian capital to remain supplied from Russia. By 2:00 a.m., Kitakarovi is in Georgian hands, and the attackers have suffered no casualties in the face of light resistance. After almost five consecutive hours of shelling, the offensive on Skinvali begins at 4:00 a.m. Although the South Asetian defenders are lightly armed and outnumbered, they put up a stiff resistance and Georgian forces struggle to penetrate into the city. Skinvali sits at the bottom of a valley with high ground on either side and the South Asetians on the opposing Prey heights to the east of the city force the attackers to halt and wait for support. At 6:00 a.m., the Georgian Third Infantry Brigade finally launches their attack on the Prey Heights, but is quickly halted by a company of South Asetian militia. Although the Georgian army has made great efforts to upgrade its forces to NATO standards, it is still an inexperienced force in combat. Meanwhile, the Georgians launch another attack into Skinvali at 6:30 a.m. This time, three T72s lead the way before they come under fire from the 250 Russian peacekeepers in the southern compound. Once the shells began falling on the city, the Russians were ordered to abandon neutrality and fight on the side of the South Asetians. After an aborted attempt to shell the compound into submission, the Georgians find a detour and enter Skinvali. However, the Russian peacekeepers will prove to be a thorn in their side for the rest of the battle. As the fighting unfolds in Skinvali, the first Russian convoy has exited the Roki tunnel and is racing for the next strategic location, the Gupta Bridge. Like the Roki tunnel, the bridge is a key bottleneck on the supply line to South Asetia. The Georgians also recognized the importance of the Gupta Bridge. At 7:00 a.m., four Georgian SU25 attack aircraft dive in and release 250 kg unguided bombs while Russian soldiers abandon their vehicles and take cover. However, not a single bomb hits the bridge or the convoy, although there are several near misses. Georgian high command is alerted to the disturbing news that Russian forces are on the move and Major General Goggava has no choice but to try and speed up the advance. At 10:00 a.m. the Georgians renew their offensive with artillery and air support pounding suspected separatist positions inside Skinvali. The main thrust into the South Asetian capital is not going according to plan as the Russian reinforcements bear down. The Georgian Interior Ministry troops tasked with capturing Skinvali are not as wellarmed as regular army soldiers, and their Turkish-made Cobra armored personnel carriers are poorly suited for urban combat. The Interior Ministry's forces attack north, while the Fourth Infantry Brigade crashes into the left flank of the South Asian defenders. Shortly after 11:00 a.m., the defenders begin to crack and the Georgian offensive finally breaks into the city. Small and uncoordinated groups of militia continue to hold out in apartment buildings, but these are quickly surrounded. While delayed, it looks as if the Georgian army will finally subdue Skinvali's defenders. The turning point comes in the afternoon when the Russian air force finally joins the fry. At 2 p.m., two Russian SU25s arrive overhead and attack the Georgian 42nd Light Battalion, killing over 20 and wounding dozens more. The survivors of the 42nd retreat in disarray just as the first Russian ground troops arrive at the city limits. The Russian Air Force launches several raids against key Georgian military bases around the country, hoping to knock out the small Georgian air force. At 3 p.m., Russian tube artillery and grad rocket launchers open fire and pound Georgian positions around Skinvali. After an hour of constant harassing fire, the Georgian forces in the city retreat back across the border, leaving small outposts in the southern suburbs. However, the battle for Skinvali is not over. As Georgian forces were fighting street by street in South Asetia, the abcasian separatist leadership in Sukumi declare partial mobilization and announced that they will act to prevent Georgia from regrouping its forces in the west. In practice, this means opening a second front, one that will stretch Georgia's limited army beyond its breaking point. Russian units from the 58th Army and the Black Sea fleet begin to move. Paratroopers from the Seventh Guards Airborne Division based in the Russian city of Novaratisk are flown into the old Soviet airfield outside the city of Gudalta on the Black Sea coast of Abcasia. Warships including the missile cruiser Mosva and the destroyer Smemet deploy off the Abcar's coast, enforcing a naval blockade and threatening to intercept Georgian vessels near the Georgian port city of Poti, the location of Georgia's naval headquarters. By dawn on the 9th of August 2008, the battle for Sinbali reaches a critical point. Georgian commanders know they are running out of time and the morning begins with a renewed offensive. Infantry from the second and fourth brigades supported by T72 tanks and self-propelled artillery push north from the villages of Zemo Nikosi and Kedakarovi. Their goal is simple. Crush remaining resistance and seize the city before Russian armor arrives. Georgian artillery batteries fire salvos of 122 mm grad rockets and 152 mm howitzer shells softening south Asetian positions that have been holding out since the night of the 7th of August. At first the attack goes well. Torton units move block by block through Skin Valley's southern outskirts using infantry fighting vehicles for fire support. But around midday the situation changes. Elements of Russia's 135th Motor Rifle Regiment, spearheaded by T72B tanks and BTR armored carriers, enter Skinvali from the west, just as Jordan forces are advancing from the south. Neither side realizes the other is this close until they collide in the city center. What follows is a confused urban brawl. Coordination on both sides breaks down as communications fail in the maze of narrow roads. During the clatch, the Russian column is hit by Georgian artillery. Lieutenant General Anatoli Krulov, commander of the 58th Army is badly wounded. Russian morale falters briefly before SU25 ground attack aircraft, scream in low, striking Georgian armor and logistics routes with S8 rockets and cannon fire. Georgian air defenses exact a high price from the Russian air force this morning, hitting an SU24 Fencer strike aircraft, contributing to the loss of an SU25 Frogoot and notably taking down a TU22M Bankfire strategic bomber. By the afternoon, Georgian momentum evaporates. President Mikuel Sarashvilli orders a short ceasefire publicly to allow civilians to flee, but privately to reorganize shattered units, but it's too late. The Russians are now fully committed. By nightfall, Skinvali is engulfed in smoke and fire. Russian troops hold the center while Georgian forces withdraw, abandoning tanks and equipment along the roads. In the western breakaway province of abcasia, abcasian and Russian forces launch operation shining path, code name for the offensive in the Kodori gorge, the last Georgian controlled area inside abcasia. By evening, Abcasian and Russian units push forward on foot, forcing the Georgians to retreat south. On the evening of the 9th of August, the war's outcome is no longer in doubt. Russia holds the initiative. By the morning of the 10th of August 2008, the outcome of the war for South Asetia is effectively decided, but the fighting is far from over. After 2 days of chaotic combat around Skinvali, Georgian troops are in retreat, and the Russians are pouring south in force. At dawn, the first convoy columns of the Russian 58th Army pushed through Skinvali, moving south towards Egetti, which now lies on the Georgian side of the administrative boundary lines, the official name for the de facto border, and the main highway leading to Gory. They are spearheaded by T72B tanks, BMP2 infantry fighting vehicles, and BTR80s supported by artillery batteries positioned north of the city. The Russian advance is methodical, moving undercover of SU25 ground attack aircraft and MI24 Hind helicopters that sweep the valley, striking at any sign of Georgian armor or troop movement. The Georgian second brigade, exhausted and disorganized after the previous day's fighting, tries to establish a defensive line south of Skinvali. But Russian artillery barges pulverize their positions as forward observers report wave after wave of rockets, mortars, and tank shells. By 8:00 p.m., the defensive line collapses. Jordan units begin falling back towards Gory, abandoning disabled tanks and armored vehicles along the road. In the air, Russian dominance is now total. Russian SU24 bombers strike Gory's military base and the bridge crossings over the Liakvi River, cutting off Georgian escape routes. Columns of refugees clog the roads, fleeing both the bombing and the advancing Russian armor. Meanwhile, to the west, South Asetian militia units begin reoccupying villages abandoned by Georgian troops. Some act as guides for Russian tank crews. Others exact revenge on local Georgian civilians accused of collaboration. Looting and arson follow in the wake of the Russian advance. By midday, Russian reconnaissance battalions reach the outskirts of Goria itself, only 18 mi south of Skinvali. Russian artillery fires several salvos into the area, causing panic, but stopping short of a direct assault. Moscow's message is clear. George's army is broken and his capital is within reach. That evening, the 58th Army consolidates its hold on South Asetia. Reinforcements from the 19th and 42nd Motor Rifle Divisions arrive, establishing new positions along the main north south highway. Russian engineers begin laying pontoon bridges across the Liakvi River to move logistics and armor more efficiently. By nightfall, Skinvali is firmly under Russian control. Dorian troops have retreated in disarray and Russian forces now occupy virtually the entire region. Once the epicenter of fierce urban fighting, the South Asetian capital is a ruin of shattered buildings, burntout vehicles, and scattered debris. Meanwhile, the Black Sea fleet tightens its grip. Russian corvettes intercept Georgian patrol boats near the coast. One is damaged and another retreats to pot. Russian marines land near the abcasian town of Oamchia to secure logistics routes for the abcasian advance. The war is entering a new phase. Georgia is no longer fighting for South Asetia. It's fighting to prevent a full-scale invasion of its heartland. By the 11th of August 2008, the war in South Asetia enters its final stage. The Georgian army is retreating, disorganized, and exhausted while the Russians begin to push deep into Georgian territory. What began as a localized conflict is rapidly transforming into an open invasion. Over the next 2 days, the Russian 58th Army fights its way into Gori, which President Sarashfilly declares an open city, which is the term used when the defense of a city is abandoned in hopes the city is only occupied and not destroyed by the enemy. At the same time, Russian paratroopers land amphibiously at the Georgian towns of Saki and Poti on the Black Sea coast, widening the front even further. Russian and abcasian units complete their offensive in the Kodori Gorge and succeed in driving out the last Georgian troops there. The country's army scattered across multiple fronts is effectively defeated. In less than a week, the Abcasian and South Asetian fronts have collapsed. Diplomatic pressure now intensified. French President Nicolas Soozi representing the European Union flies to Moscow on the 12th to negotiate a ceasefire. After hours of talks with Dmitri Metvidev, Russia agrees to halt operations in exchange for Georgian withdrawal from the conflict zones and a pledge of non-use of force. By the evening of the 12th of August, major combat operations winded down. This was a turning point for Russian Western relations because the West didn't do much else except bring the war to an end. They didn't protect Georgia. They didn't make sure that Russia stuck to the agreement. Russia did not stick to the agreement. They didn't go back to Russian territory. They stayed in South Asetia and of course they were already in abaza. So it was a signal to Putin that the West was soft. When the guns finally fall silent after 5 days of fighting, the cost is staggering. In Georgia, more than 400 soldiers and civilians are dead, and nearly 2,000 are wounded. Entire towns in the Gory region lie in ruins, their residents fleeing before advancing Russian tanks. Over 130,000 people are displaced in the chaos. And though many later return, tens of thousands never go home. Their villages in South Asetia are burned, bulldozed, or permanently emptied. On the Russian and South Asetian side, casualty figures are lower, but still heavy. Moscow reports 64 soldiers killed and around 300 wounded while the South Asian authorities claim around 160 civilian deaths mainly occurring during the Georgian shelling of Skinvali on the first night of the war. When the fighting ends, Russian troops occupy large areas of central and western Georgia, including the key city of Gori, the Saki military base, and the port of Poti on the Black Sea. Partial withdrawals begin only in early September and by the 10th of October, Russian troops have finally left the buffer zones. Moscow finally recognizes abcazia and South Asetia as independent states on the 26th of August 2008 and signed defense agreements that legalize a permanent military presence there. Georgia bears the greatest loss for the conflict. The war shatters its hope of regaining control over its breakaway regions and deepens the divisions that began decades earlier. The political fallout in Tlisi is immediate and lasting. By 2012, Georgians have turned against Mikuel Sarash Philly, voting his party out of power and ending nearly a decade of his rule. He leaves office quietly, but is forced to flee the country after he is convicted of embezzling state funds. The former president finds a new home in Ukraine where he is given citizenship and even carves out a political career. On the 1st of October 2021, Male Sarash Villi returns to Georgia only to be immediately arrested. Internationally, Georgia's dream of NATO membership fades into uncertainty. The war leaves Georgia more isolated and its reform agenda overshadowed by loss. Once so close to NATO membership, Georgia is still trapped within Russia's sphere of influence and an unsettled domestic situation. In the end, both sides bear responsibility for the 5-day war. Georgia chose to open fire on Skinvali first, gambling that it could retake South Asetia before Russia reacted. Moscow, for its part, had spent years shaping the conflict, encouraging dissonance, separatism, and attacks against Georgians in South Asetia while prepositioning forces to turn Georgia's reaction into an opportunity, a rapid invasion, a redrawn map, and a brutal lesson to the rest of the postsviet space. In Russia, the war is celebrated as a turning point, and the moment Moscow reclaims its power on the world stage. The 5-day campaign restores a sense of pride lost since the Soviet collapse. The 2008 war fundamentally reshapes how Moscow views its neighborhood and the West. In the Kremlin's eyes, NATO's hesitation over Georgia proves that Western security guarantees stop at the borders of the former Soviet Union. Russia begins to speak openly of its privileged interests in nearby countries. A doctrine that treats postsviet states not as equals but as part of a protective buffer. The war cementss the image of a Russia that no longer takes humiliation from the West. Yet beneath the triumph lies a harder truth. The conflict exposes serious flaws in Russia's military, including sluggish communication, outdated equipment, and chaotic command structures. The lessons learned in Georgia drive a decade of reform, shaping a more modern mobile army. Internationally, the backlash is brief and weak Western sanctions prove ineffective. Moscow concludes that force works. By recognizing abcasia and South Asetia, Russia redraws the map of the Caucuses and sets a precedent it will later invoke in Ukraine. The war ends in victory, but it also marks the beginning of something larger. A Russia once again willing to fight for its place in the world. Thanks again to Professor Steven Jones, the founding director of the program on Georgian studies at Harvard University and author of Georgia, a political history since independence. Also to professor Ronald Gregor Sunni, professor emeritus of history and political science at the universities of Chicago and Michigan and author of Forging the Nation: The Making and Faking of Nationalisms.