The qualification of the 613 mitzvos | Rabbi Yitzchak Breitowitz | June 2 2026

Good morning, good morning, everybody. Hope, uh, hope you're well. Um, we're still, uh, this will probably be the last session on the particular letter we're looking at, so don't worry, we're going to be almost finished with it. Uh, this is the letter to, uh, Reb Pinchas HaDayan, who you'll recall was a Dayan who came from Provence, came from France, and relocated from Christian France and relocated to Islamic, uh, Egypt, and had different adjustment problems and occasionally got into some disagreements with the Rambam. Uh, etc. And, as I say, the letter is very interesting because it is a fascinating mixture of personal, uh, problems with halakhic issues. So, the last issue we're going to talk about is indeed a halakhic issue. And, in order to understand the background, there's a lot of, uh, preliminary information I need to give you, and I need to revisit something we discussed a long time ago. So, I'm not sure if I hope you remember, I hope you forget. That's always a problem when you when you repeat. Uh, but here is the thing. One of the very, very beautiful works that the Rambam wrote, uh, before he wrote the Mishneh Torah, was a much shorter work called the Sefer HaMitzvot, the Sefer of Mitzvot. And unlike the Mishneh Torah that was written in Hebrew, Mishnaic Hebrew, uh, Sefer HaMitzvot was originally written in Arabic, and was translated by, uh, Shmuel ibn Tibbon, the same person who translated the Moreh Nevukhim. There are also a few other translations as well. So, the Sefer HaMitzvot will be found in Hebrew, but one needs to know that that is a translation, uh, from the Arabic. Now, the Sefer HaMitzvot is a compendium of a brief description, a brief description. We're talking about typically five lines. Uh typically of every mitzvah in the Torah, the 613 mitzvahs of the Torah. And many have posited that the Rambam wrote it as essentially an outline of the Mishneh Torah. The Rambam never made that absolutely clear, but essentially, in fact, one of the enigmas in the Sefer Hamitzvot is the order with which the Rambam presents the mitzvahs. The Rambam does not present the mitzvahs in the order they appear in the Torah. And there's a bit of a mystery, what is the order, but some have pointed out the order actually follows the Mishneh Torah, meaning to say as an outline. When the Rambam determined the order of presentation, uh that is what he encapsulated in the Sefer Hamitzvot. Uh now, the Sefer Hamitzvot is not a book of halakha. It does not give you all the laws of the mitzvahs. That is the purpose of the Mishneh Torah, obviously, but it is a brief description of every single mitzvah. Now, the Sefer Hamitzvot has three Although it's a short book, actually has three different sections. Part one, part two, part three. Part two and three, I'll get to one, uh are rela- relatively self-evident. Part two is a description of the 248 positive commandments, mitzvot asei. And part three is an enumeration of the mitzvot lo taaseh. Uh and of course, 248 + 365 = the 613, and that is the tradition that we have 613 mitzvahs, some of which apply today, some of which do not apply today. Um now, you already see that dividing it up that way does create a certain organizational problem because many many commandments have both a positive and a negative. Let's take the mitzvah of Shabbos. Uh, there's a mitzvah not to do melacha, but there's also a mitzvah to rest on Shabbos. Now, really, they're two sides of the same coin, that when I don't do melacha on Shabbos, I am fulfilling the positive commandment of ubayom hashvii tishbos, and I am [clears throat] not transgressing the negative of lo sa'aseh kol melacha. It's really addressing the same thing. And yet, one mitzvah will be discussed in part two, and one mitzvah will be discussed in part three. Uh, so, the point about the Sefer Hamitzvos, part two and part three, is number one, the order does not follow the order of the Torah anyway, and number two, the division, the segmentation of the assei and the lo sa'aseh can sometimes mean that an identical concept may be discussed in two different places, and you'd have to check all of those places in order to get the full discussion. Okay. So, that's part two and part three. Part two, the 248 mitzvos assei, and part three is the 365 mitzvos lo sa'aseh. So, then you may ask, so what is part one? Part one is absolutely a very very unique, innovative, original contribution that the Rambam made to the science of mitzvatology, if there is such a such a phrase. The Rambam was not the first one to try to enumerate the 613. Now, again, what what's the origin of the 613? The origin of the 613 is a Gemara in Maseches Makos, which is really a statement of an isolated amora that says God gave Mosha commandments and this is based on the verse Torah tziva lanu Mosha. Mosha commanded us a Torah. And the Gemara asked the kasha, well, Torah big matria is not 613. Torah big matria is only 611. So, how do you say there are 613? The answer is, ah, Mosha communicated to us 611. But, there were two commandments we heard directly from Hashem. And that is the first two commandments of the Decalogue, of the Aseres Hadibros, anochi Hashem Elokecha, I am the Lord your God, and lo yihiyeh lecha elohim acherim, you shall not have any other gods. So, therefore, it works out very well. At that point we got frightened. At that point we asked Mosha to be the intermediary. So, all the other 611 we got from Mosha, right? Torah tziva lanu Mosha. 611 and two we heard from God, and thus we get 613. And even the breakdown of the 365 and the 248 is in that same Maimon Chazal uh in which it says the 365 either corresponds to your uh sinews or ligaments or they correspond to the year, the days of a solar year. Uh that every time you violate a negative commandment, you're impairing a ligament or uh affecting a day of the year. Of course, that's interesting. Uh we don't have Well, well, again, there's a lot that the Gemara is not telling us. And the 248 positive commandments corresponds to the uh bones of the human body, which are bones. And every time you do a positive commandment, you are giving you are giving spiritual life to the bones. Now, what exactly happens to the bones and the ligaments when you do sins or mitzvahs is not really clear. I mean, if someone has arthritis, we're not going to say, "Oh, it's because he didn't do a proper I mean, maybe it's that, but but maybe not. So, obviously, this is a spiritual idea. Now, this is a statement in the Gemara by a single person. A single person. And there's a lot that the Gemara does not tell us. For one thing, the Gemara does not give us a list of the 613. There is no list. Obviously, there are discussions in the Gemara in isolation. Is something a mitzvah? Is something not a mitzvah? For example, when it says, "Do not charge a Jew interest, but you can charge a non-Jew interest." It's an offering. Is that a mitzvah? You should charge a non-Jew interest? Or is it just permission? So, obviously, there are many arguments about particular things, but there is absolutely in Chazal no listing whatsoever of the 613. And there's certainly no listing that correlates which mitzvahs go to which bones and ligaments. Theoretically, there would be such a thing. And some later swarm have tried to kind of figure this out, but the Talmud doesn't tell us. Now, the number 613 was accepted by virtually all later commentaries as the number that you're working with. The only one that raises the question, "Well, who says we got to accept that?" is interestingly enough Ramban, Ramban Nachmanides. Nachmanides spends a few pages kind of debating, well, you know, listen. I mean, one person in the Gemara have mentioned 613, does that become an article of faith? What if we had more than 613? What if we had less than 613? Because the problem is you're going to say that when people try to count it, they get into all sorts of problems. So, Ramban actually suggests, who says we're wedded to 613? And the Ramban points out that if you're wedded to the number 613, you're always going to have a problem. Well, let let me give you two two examples that the Ramban brings. There There are more than that, but let's just take two examples. There are two cases in the Gemara where the Gemara debates is something a mitzvah or is something a reshut. Reshut means optional. One is what I had mentioned a moment ago, whether you charge a non-Jew interest, is that a mitzvah or is that a reshut? Another is by eved Kenaani, by non-Jewish slaves. The Torah says, "Leolam bahem ya'avodu." Unlike a Jewish slave that is freed after 6 years, a non-Jewish slave is a slave forever. So, the question is, is that simply giving you permission to hold on to him? Maybe it's some later that we'll talk about the morality of slavery, but that's not the the topic right now. Or is there actually a mitzvah to keep him in slavery? And indeed, the Gemara says, you're not allowed to free your non-Jewish slave unless there's a compelling reason. The Gemara gives the story that Rabbi Eliezer walked into shul and with his eved Kenaani, and he was the ninth man for the minyan, and the eved Kenaani would have been the 10th person, but an eved cannot count for a minyan. So, he freed his Eved. He gave up It's like paying $100,000. He freed his Eved. And when an Eved Kena'ani is freed, he becomes a full-fledged Jew in order to count him for a minyan. So, he was willing And again, as I say, it's like giving up uh $100,000 to make to make a minyan. Uh and the Gemara asks a kasha, "How can he free his slave? You're not allowed to free your slave." And the Gemara's answer is I get my clock is finished. Show you the model learn it that for a very important mitzvah, it would be permitted, but otherwise, not. So, we have a machlokes though. There is an opinion that says it's only a reshus. If you want to free him, you can free him, but you're allowed to keep him. Now, Rebbi Eliezer. Now, Ramban makes the following argument. If you're wedded to the number 613, then if you're So, how does this work? Meaning, one opinion says this is a mitzvah. And one opinion says it's not a mitzvah both in the case of interest of non-Jew and freeing an Eved. Well, that would mean, would it not, that the one that says it's a mitzvah now has 614? Or or conversely, if you're going to say that it's 613, if this is a mitzvah, then the other opinion only has 612. Me- Meaning, how do you coordinate it here? Uh because every time you add, you know, you're you're you're you're increasing the 613, or if you're getting the 613, the other opinion is one less. So, it has to be that either we're not wedded to 613, maybe there's 614, maybe there's 615, maybe there's 700. Or perhaps there has to be some type of zero-sum game here that whenever you add something, something else is subtracted. But but but we're not told what that subtraction is going to be. So, the Rambam, very fascinatingly, again, if he would say today, he would be condemned as an epicurus. But of course, it's been well said that the Rambam for sure would have been condemned as an epicurus cuz the Rambam would be violating his 13 principles of faith that he formulated. Okay. That's the way things work today. But the Ramban is the only one who actually plays with the idea that, you know, 613 was an opinion and there might be other ways of doing it. But even the Ramban at the end of the day, his mascana is, his conclusion is, okay. Everybody seems to go with 613, so we'll accept it and the Ramban therefore works out in great detail that whenever you add something, you subtract something and he tries to work it out. Okay. So, the point is this. Based on the Gemara in Makkos, we are kind of stuck with the number 613. And not only are we stuck with that number, but we're also stuck with the 248 positives and the 365 negatives, but we are not given the benefit of any listing in Chazal of the 613 mitzvahs. So, already in the time of the Gaonim, meaning after the Gemara, in the Gaonim, different types of lists were made up. And the most famous of them, Rav Saadia Gaon, wrote a listing of the 613 mitzvahs. Uh but the earliest one was even before Rav Saadia Gaon. It is in the Sefer Halachot Gedolot. And there's a machlokes who is the author of Halachot Gedolot. Some say it's Rabbi Shimon Kayyara and others say Rabbi Yehudai Gaon. And it's known as Bahag. Bahag. Bahag means Bahal, the author of Hilchos Gedolos. Hilchos Gedolos is said to be the very first Halachic safer after the Gemara itself, meaning uh in the early years of the Gaonim, they tried to extract from Talmudic discussion what you might call Halacha L'Maaseh, because anyone who learns Gemara knows that Gemara typically does not give you bottom lines. The Gemara gives you many opinions and many interpretations, and one of the jobs of the Gaonim, and remember this is before the Rif, before the Rambam, before the Shulchan Aruch. Right? Obviously, this got really developed later, but the Bahag was like the first effort to kind of create codifications of the bottom line in Halacha. Now again, later authorities didn't necessarily follow the Bahag, but this was the the the whole purpose of Hilchos Gedolos. Now, the Bahag's book is prefaced with a Hakdamah. Uh and it's interesting, it's not even clear if the Bahag wrote the Hakdamah. But in the Hakdamah, whoever wrote the Hakdamah, the Rambam assumes it's the Bahag, but some say it may not be, he says, "Before we discuss all of the Halachos, let me give you a list of the 613 Mitzvos of the Torah." So, one of the earliest, may perhaps perhaps the earliest listing of the 613 Mitzvos is that in the Hakdamah of the Bahag, Hilchos Gedolos. And and as I say, the Rambam over and over again just asserts this is the Bahag's Minyan, although as I say, some scholars have questioned whether the Bahag K'chol a share Yeruha. So, the Rambam says when a person says, "I don't have to keep this commandment because it's only rabbinic." The Rambam says that's not true. Because the Torah itself commands you to obey the Hakhamin. And the proof for this idea is that before we do a mitzvah d'rabbanan we make a brakha. Let's take Hanukkah. And Hanukkah is indisputably a rabbinic commandment. Because it happens you know, after this after the destruction of the first Beit Hamikdash. It happened during the second Beit Hamikdash. And yet, I still make the brakha. Barukh ata Adonai Eloheinu Melekh ha'olam asher kid'shanu b'mitzvotav. He has sanctified us with his commandments. V'tzivanu and he has com- He has commanded us l'hadlik ner shel Hanukkah. Now, did God command us to light Hanukkah candles? He did not. But indirectly, the Rambam says, since he commands us to obey the decision of the Hakhamin, so it becomes a d'oraita. But here's what the Rambam says. Because this is a generic directive to follow the Hakhamin, we do not count the individual rabbinic laws as separate mitzvot. Because then you would have another 500 added. We have one mitzvah. Lo tasur, which encompasses all rabbinic laws, as well as one positive commandment for your sisa who called it Yeruha. So, instead of the methodology of counting every rabbin on as a separate commandment we have one commandment called listen to the Hahamim. We have it We have it both as a negative commandment and a positive commandment. We actually have two two of them. Okay, so you see the idea? So, the Rambam is moda that you're obligated under Torah law to listen to the Hahamim. But, he's not going to count every rabbinic law as a separate commandment. And he points out that the the Bahag anyway is inconsistent because the Bahag picks Hanukkah and Megillah. But, what about netilat shadayim? I mean I mean there are many I mean once you get into the business of counting every individual rabbin on why are you only counting Hanukkah and Megillah? There's netilat shadayim. There's kriat saTorah. Uh there's davening the Amida. You know, there there's muktsa. You know, so so the Rambam's approach is yes these rabbinans are deoraitas. But, they are deoraitas under the general rule and they do not get counted separately. That's principle number one. And uh here uh indeed the Bahag is very very difficult. Even the Ramban who wrote extensive commentaries on the sefer hamitzvot and the Ramban tries to defend the Bahag. Like because the Rambam attacks the Bahag throughout all the 14 shorashim, every single shore ish there's some criticism of the Bahag. And the Ramban uh tries valiantly to defend the Hilchos Gedolos. But, on this one the the even the Ramban kind of throws up his hands and says um I have difficulty uh with uh with with with this one. Okay. Um now there's all sorts of questions about lo sassur. Sometimes, uh, you walk by, you know, Yerushalayim is very rich in wall posters, paskvilin, which, you know, every day somebody's put in cherem and whatever it is, uh, and the like. So, you you you might often see that, uh, the great rabbis, never giving you their names, the great rabbis have declared, uh, that, you know, smartphones are ossur, and they'll quote the pasuk, "Lo sassur." Do not turn away. So, what does lo sassur apply to? In other words, you must listen to the rabbis. Who are the rabbis that you have to listen to? So, the truth of the matter is, in the Rambam's own definition, lo sassur is referring very, very specifically not to the rabbis. It is referring to the Sanhedrin of 71, which was our Supreme Court. And the Torah even says that if someone refuses to follow that decision, they could be put to death. That's called the zaken mamre, at least if he was uh, qualified enough to be a dayan. So, if your local rabbi says something, or or or even if the gadol hador says something, so here here is the thing. This is a subtle point, and I I do not want to be misunderstood. Certainly, bederech klal, one should follow the psakim of gedolim. Of course, of course, who is gedolim, and gedolim argue, okay, those are questions, but however, not because the Torah says I have to follow their advice. But, because probabilistically, they are probably more correct in their understanding of Torah than I. That's a That's a very different point. It's not an institutional authority. It is a probabilistic judgment. In In other words, like this. If Rebbe Elyashiv, let's say, came to a certain shot, and let's assume nobody argued with him. And I learned the subject. And I am convinced that Rebbe Elyashiv misunderstood the Gemara. I am convinced. Now, am I obligated to follow his decision because he was a gadol? The answer is I'm not. I'm not. Unlike the case of a Sanhedrin, where I would have to follow them even if I thought they were wrong, Rebbe Elyashiv was not a Sanhedrin. So, if in my judgment And please don't don't don't uh Don't go out until I finish the sentence. If in my judgment Rebbe Elyashiv was wrong, I have the right to follow my view. But, here's the thing. It would be foolish to do so simply because if if there's some question, is he right or am I right, a reasonable amount of common sense humility would indicate that he probably got it right. Now, do you see the difference here? If the Sanhedrin issues a decision, that is the halakha. So, I have to follow that. If Rebbe Elyashiv issues a decision, that doesn't make it the halakha. That is an opinion as to what the halakha is. And he has his opinion, and I have my opinion, and theoretically, I'm allowed to follow my opinion, but I would be perhaps an idiot for doing so. So, there's a subtle difference here between what what you might call institutional finality, which is the Sanhedrin, versus probabilistic judgments. I mean, let's take something Let's take Let's take a secular example. Let's take physics. Let's assume that I'm convinced that Einstein misunderstood general relativity. Now, do I have the right to say that Einstein got it wrong? For sure I do. But, you know, what are the chances? At least from my from my I mean, there may be physicists who might have standing, but from my perspective, the chances that somehow I could prove Einstein wrong are not that likely. So, the MS is the license or that says you must obey is actually referring to the Sanhedrin. It's not referring to the Godol Dor. It's not go rabbis generally, although I I as I submitted, probabilistically, it is important to very much respect and even revere the opinions of people who are much much greater than us. And again, I understand who's a Godol? That's a real good question. Um What do you do when there's a machlokes about the Torah and the real good question. I'm not answering a lot of questions. I just want to differentiate between the concept of Sanhedrin and the concept of Godol or rabbi or whatever it is. They are operating on two different planes. Now, this is my understanding of the Rambam's view. And that's why the Rambam, by the way, didn't have any problem with arguing on Gaonim. You could argue against Gaonim. The Gaonim are, you know, from the earlier generations. And the Rambam maintained that yeah, he had the right to argue with them because they were not a Sanhedrin and their decisions were not binding. In fact, the Rambam even had a problem that he had to address. Uh what makes the Talmud authoritative? Because much of the Talmud represents discussions that were after the Sanhedrin was abolished. And the Rambam had to develop an alternative route in which since Am Yisrael accepted the Talmud as authoritative, that makes it like the Sanhedrin. I mean but that's that's a big critique, you know. Uh but you see that based on the Rambam's authority idea even the Talmud would create a certain problem. Did you want to say something again? >> Yeah, I have a question. This also brought up a lot of issues. For example, in the conservative movement how you interpret, let's say for Shabbat, and I is electricity really turning on a car or >> Yeah. >> something like that. You're saying, well, I there's no Sanhedrin ruling on that, obviously. >> Yeah. >> They are interpreting it, you know, you're it opens up this kind of >> Uh it does open up a Pandora's Box and you know uh since uh my reputation is shot anyway, so I I can say things that uh are a little controversial. Uh but but but again, I do want That's why I do want to underscore that I am a big proponent of reverence, respect, and and understanding our limitations vis-a-vis the truly great Torah scholars. So, I'm not espousing a concept of do your own thing, find your own path. Uh I do think you have to look at the Gedolei HaPoskim. I'm just saying it is fundamentally a different institutional framework than a Sanhedrin. Now, to be honest, though, I got to be a complete The Sefer HaChinuch seems to who came after the Rambam And that also was a companion of mitzvahs that's largely based on the Rambam's listening. I'll get to it. The safer hachinuch uh actually does include in leisa soer a mitzvah to listen to gedolei hador. And the the interesting question is what's the what's his source for that assertion? And then that opens up again a Pandora's Box. Who is a godol hador? You know, uh I can tell you this. Uh in Israel uh the selection of gedolei hador seems to be made by the media. You have Yad Ne'eman and the like, and that is not a halachic basis uh for determining uh gedolim. Uh so it is it is tricky and I don't want to get into all of that right now. Uh but I just want to point out that the Rambam is moving in two directions at once. On one hand, he's saying you don't count the rabbinic laws as part of the 613. On the other hand, listening to the rabbinic laws is one of the Torah requirements, right? So he's making it every rabbinic is deoraita, but we don't count them as separate deoraitas. We count them as one deoraita. Now, uh that's that's shoresh one, right? So you see it's a rich that's the first shoresh. Another shoresh, just to give you an example of the 14 shoresh, is that the Rambam says we only count in the 613 mitzvahs mitzvahs that are eternally binding. There are many mitzvot in the Torah that were only given for the generation of the desert that I mean let's take this. Hashem tells Moshe, "Take your staff and stretch it over the Nile." Well, is that a mitzvah? Well, it depends what you mean. Is that a command? Yeah, it is a command. So, why don't I count as a mitzvah? Pick up your staff and stretch it. But, the answer is it was not a permanent command. It was a command for one particular occasion. Many, many statements of the Almighty were one particular occasion. And even something that was for many years. For example, do not leave your mun over until the morning. Meaning, finish it. Is that a divine command? Yes, it is. It's a divine command. Is it one of the 613 mitzvah? No, it's not because it's not permanent. Now, you may ask a question, well, what does that mean not permanent? I mean, we do count in the mitzvahs the mitzvah of korbanot and all sorts of things that are not permanent. But, the truth is they are permanent. But, you need necessary conditions. Meaning, at any point that we get the base of mikdash we're going to bring the korbanos. In other words, the fact that a mitzvah has conditions and without those conditions, you can't do the mitzvah, that does not make a mitzvah temporary. It is a permanent mitzvah that has certain conditions that at different times in our history are not always going to be met. That's very different than a temporary mitzvah. Now, it's interesting that on this particular show dish which Ramban Ramban writes extensive commentaries mainly on the Shulchan Aruch. Uh Ramban raises an interesting question and this comes up with um last week's parsha. The Torah says Leviim have mandatory retirement age. Very young. At least from my perspective, extremely young. Got to retire at 50. Right? Go to Florida, right? You're a Levi at 50, you move to Florida. So, what's the shot? So, is there a commandment? Cuz the Torah says, "Lo ya'avod od." You shall not work anymore. That's a negative commandment. That's a lo ta'aseh. Now, obviously when there's it's only it only applies when there's a Beit Hamikdash, but the question is is there an aveira for a Levi to work in the Beit Hamikdash beyond the age of 50? So, the Rambam says no. And listen to what the Rambam's logic. The Rambam says, "The primary reason why Leviim were disqualified at the age of 50 is because one of their jobs was to carry the Aron Hakodesh on their shoulders when the Mishkan is moving from place to place. And it was thought that after the age of 50, the physical strength is not at its maximum. So, the Torah excluded the Torah required retirement at 50. But since the ark was not carried from place to place once we had a Beit Hamikdash, so the reason for the retirement no longer applied. Therefore, the Rambam does not count lo ya'avod od as one of the 613 mitzvahs because it was meant to apply only during the years in the desert when the Mishkan was transported from place to place." Now, Ramban, accepting the Rambam's rule, disagrees with the application. Because the Rambam says, well, listen, it's true that if you're not transporting the ark, there is no issue of physical strength, and it's also true that generally speaking the ark would not be transported, but theoretically it might have to be moved. And basically, let's say uh enemies attack or whatever. And in fact, in the days of Yoshiyahu Hamelech, before the Churban, the Aron Hakodesh was removed from the Kodesh Hakodashim, and it was hidden. It actually was. So, he says, so, just because it's going to be a very rare case of moving the aura, but if it still exists, this mitzvah will still apply, right? So, that's a machlokes of application, but in in principle, uh if it's not uh going to be uh if it's not going to be permanent, it is not counted as one of the mitzvahs, yeah. >> Rabbi, I have a very interesting question, which may be a light when the Rov says, "If you get a draft notice, throw it out." Is he acting as somebody who is giving you a Torah mitzvah, or is he telling you something maybe where you shouldn't get involved? >> Well, you know, um this is a circular type of question, because if you ask me, you'll get one answer. If you ask him, you'll get a different answer. So, it's like uh you know, um I will I will just say this. Uh I am I am not going to answer whether you should listen to him or not, but I will say it is not a Torah mitzvah to listen to him. Uh that's what I will say. Uh whether you should listen to him or not, I'll leave that to to you or to the to the individual that needs to make the decision. But to claim Torah authority, Torah authority, for that type of directive, uh is not true. >> Um you know, as a rabbi, you're aware of all these statements. And the latest of I'm I'm very confused. Like, what's the commandment of of of the Torah >> No, no. So, so So, see I mean you need to know you need to know some Jewish history. For example, uh Hanukkah was indeed an enactment when there was a Sanhedrin. Uh so, as a result, it has full absolute halakhic authority. Uh the Sanhedrin remained in existence till around the 5th century, the 400s. So, much of what we call rabbinic law is indeed a product of the Sanhedrin. So, that's why the Mishnah and the Gemara, most of that stuff is binding on us precisely for those for those reasons. Again, I I I I I mean I'm I'm again I'm working on on on thin ice here. I am not advocating disobeying uh poskim at all. I'm simply saying the reason I listen to a posek is not the same reason I listen to a Sanhedrin. I listen to a Sanhedrin because definitionally, that's the halakha. I listen to a posek because my respect for his opinion as to what the halakha is should be very great. But, technically, it is an opinion. It does not create the halakha. It is an expert an expert opinion as to what the halakha is, but that's not the same as creating the halakha. It's a subtle distinction. I I do think uh I I think it's an important one just to understand. And therefore, the idea that if I don't follow a posek, I am violating lo tasur, I I think it's an incorrect statement. I might be sinning because I might be violating the halacha because the possuk might be correct, but it would not be a low so sorry so it would simply be an issue of I'm incorrectly following Hilchos Shabbos or whatever it may be. >> This is like a little bit of like Russian when money goes up and down and you're paying for it for the exchange. Is that ribbis? >> Uh Uh it's very possible that it is. I that's an interesting question. A lot of people ask me that because of the exchange rates. Um I I I won't talk about it. Maybe next week just just to give you a little bit of an answer. But the the short answer is it really depends on the transaction. Uh if it is a shekel transaction, then you have to pay in shekels equal to what you got uh even if that's more dollars. If it's a dollars transaction, you have to pay shekels equal to the dollars at the time. So, it all depends on how the loan is actually structured. Okay, well we'll see you next week. Have a good good week everybody.