Rambam’s Letters (Pt V) | Rabbi Yitzchak Breitowitz

I hope you're well. Um I was given a request although I myself do not mind uh questions during the year but a number of people requested that maybe we could uh hold off uh questions until after the class or towards the end of the class uh and the Yeah. Yeah. I was just saying that although I myself personally have no objection to questions during the class uh but a number of people did request uh that uh you hold off questions till maybe towards the end of the class because it breaks up uh the continuity again I uh just to clear my own name it's not my the objection is not coming from me it's coming from uh members of the class I I I actually don't like to shut off questions but sometimes s people feel that it uh interrupts the the continuity of of of things. Uh we are still uh looking is okay the mic is working right. We are still yeah we are still looking at Mideshm and uh the Rambam now goes into the aspect and uh here is the thing the Rambam first develops a certain definition of what is kush hashem what is the sanctification of god's name and what is the opposite what is kul hashem what is the desecration of god's name because there actually is a positive commandment in the Torah to sanctify God's name is and there is a negative commandment to desecrate God's name as shame. So one of the two of the 613 mitzvos is the mitzvah of koshashem and the mitzvat of hashem. The problem is that kdeshm and hashem are not necessarily clearly defined terms. It's not like a mitzvah to put on or a mitzvah to not do on chabas. So they have to be given a content. They have to be given a definition. So the Rambam first says that there is a general standard of keshashem and the Rambam breaks it down into two. Actually he talks about in this sense there is the idea which is the familiar idea that when you behave in a way that brings Judaism or Torah or God into disrepute by virtue of your behavior. Right? This is the common definition actually. This is what we call even if there is no technical violation of meaning even if you're not transgressing anything else. If your behavior brings Torah into disgrace or disrepute, that is called to give you a contemporary example or actually Pascin that you're not supposed to form minanim on airplanes if that's going to block the aisle or block people's access to either the bathroom or the storees from delivering food, you know, whatever it would be because that would be a paradigm of Hashem. People are going to say, "Oh, that's what religious Jews do. You know, they don't care about people and the like." Um, I don't want to get too political, but many people think the huffka that are we we're always having here, blocking traffic and the like uh to protest government action might fall under the category of kilashem throwing stones at uh not not religious Jews or throwing even bags of excrement at women at the wall. Uh many consider that to be kulashem. So that's a general idea of kulashem. Don't do things that cause a disgrace on the part of Torah. Now, the Ramba makes the point that interestingly enough, the greater you are, the more you are, the higher the standard is going to be. So, if a an eighth grader pushes somebody out of line or is rude, that maybe that's not aem because kids are kids or maybe it's a small of. But if you had a great rasha speak rudely to people that's a much bigger. So somebody so the once uh criticized the talmet for doing things that are so the tom says you know rabbi I'm nobody I'm nobody important. So what I do does not reflect on Judaism. So said it's a mitzvah to be humble but when it comes to and you have to be a bala you have to look at yourself as like the greatest rabbi in the world and behave accordingly because the truth of the matter is uh we are judged as representatives I mean certainly um I mean I think often of the yeshiva student that comes to a small comes home to a small community where where there aren't that many Orthodox Jews Now he may not be any big but he will certainly be considered to be the standard bearer of what is and as a result every single action will be scrutinized for its ore. So in short the basic definition which I think most of us already kind of worked with is when people look at you and say if this is the way a Torah Jew lives that's a good and wonderful thing is when people look at you and say if this is what a Torah Jew does that is a despicable thing which means according to that definition which is our basic definition there always has to be an observer meaning and keshm is a function of people Jews or non-Jews and actually visav Jews is even bigger Jews or non-Jews in other words has to be an observer meaning what you're doing privately one would assume does not enter into the definition of andem but then somewhat surprisingly the Rambam says there is a concept of kdesem and even in private you're doing stuff nobody even knows knows what you're doing. But the Rambam says if a person commits a veros with an attitude of indifference, I just don't care. Meaning you can do an aa because the atahara grabs you. You just have this unbelievable hunger for a ham sandwich. Okay, it's not justifiable, but okay, you gave into your tya. That's one thing. But if you do an aa simply because I don't really care. So the Rambam actually calls that a desecration of God's name. It's very interesting. Totally private. Not because other people saw you and not because other people will judge you in a in a ne or judge Torah in a negative way but simply because the attitude of indifference towards God's will in itself is a hashem. That's a very interesting notion of private. So we have public kilashem we have private kilashem but then we have a third category and the ram interestingly enough and there's not a clear mccor in the gammorra and that is whenever there is a duty to give your life for god when you give your life for hashem that is called kosh when you don't give your life when you should have done so that is called now again it's very very important to understand And the following and do not define when you must give your life. Meaning when you must give your life is defined by other rules, other in other words and do not give you any definition of when there's a duty of martyrdom. But the Rambam learns once we know there is a duty of martyrdom that will become subsumed under the definition of keshashem and a person who does not give his life when there's a duty of martyrdom that is called a kilulashem. And if that was done privately that is aem that is private. If it is done publicly, we'll define what publicly means. Uh that is a hashem public. Okay. So that's an interesting point. So in a sense, we have three categories of Hashem. We have general behavior that brings Judaism into disrepute. We have uh even private behavior that represents an indifference to the service of God. And then we have uh martyrdom. When there is when there is a duty of martyrdom then uh when you if you're if you do give your life that is kushem when you fail to give your life when there's a duty of martyrdom there is and the raam brings many that talk about the great olabah for those who die alashm. Now there is a very very interesting question about this notion of dying aldeshm uh you know we often say about the people who were killed in the holocaust uh that they died al kidush hashem or we say aboutim that they died al- kidush hashem uh let's take the holocaust first it actually is a little bit of a difficult issue because what is the sanctification of god's name when you give your life. It seems to presuppose a certain element of of choice or volition. Meaning the crusades they go over to me and say uh become Christian or I will kill you. And a person declares my commitment to God is so great that I will die before I renounce God and his Torah. So that is called sanctification of God's name because you're placing your allegiance to God even above your life and that is stating how important that is. But that's because you had the choice. You could have become Christian or professed Christianity and you didn't. Now in the case of the Holocaust, what's interesting is there was not that element of choice. Meaning Hitler didn't say you know become Christian and you will be saved and if not I will kill you. In fact there were Jews who converted to Christianity for you know various reasons and they died in Ashvitz as well. In fact there was a woman Edith Stein who was actually a saint in the Roman Catholic Church who was a Jewish woman who became a Carmelite nun and she died. Now the the part of how the church canonized her was she was treated as a martyr to her faith. It's hard to know why she's a martyr to her faith. Uh she didn't die because she was a Christian. She died because she was a Jew. Uh but the question becomes this again. Maybe it's a painful question to raise. How is it keshm if a person is going to be killed no matter what they profess uh when there was no choice that could have gotten them out of the of the situation. So some say well uh even if you don't have choice there can be keshashem in the nobility by which you choose to die. Uh Resler Revelo Destler the great Melio who came from Kellum which was a city on the Lithuanian German uh border and before World War II he had already moved to England and after the war eventually to Erit Israel but his whole family was wiped out in Kellum. Kellum was a small town but it was a great great city of Muser and a famous famous famous school of Muser uh run by Rafima Zisil Brady and then his sons and sons-in-law uh he's called the altar of Kellum the old man of Kellum etc. He was probably Ravis Salanter's dominant talmet. And uh Rev Destler lost his whole family in the massacre of Kellum which was just one of many many massacres and uh there was a survivor an eyewitness and Rev Destler spent hours and hours trying to reconstruct from the eyewitness exactly what happened. And he described the massacre of Kellum uh in his writings and he talks about the idea that before the Nazis were going to round people up uh the Roshiva Rabdil Vashitz uh spoke to his talid and says we're about to die al to serve God it's important that we're like a corban that we don't allow any foreign thought to us and there was a calmness and a reverence and a preparation for death and that it says says, "The Nazi murderers were themselves a little discombobulated. They had never seen human beings approaching death with such inner serenity and calmness. They were used to people screaming, crying. That was part of the regiment. They wanted people to be humiliated and just beg and and then they could shoot them. And these were not beggars at all. They were just preparing to meet God. And it mentions that when the person when the Nazi was given the order to shoot He turned to his superior officer and said, "You know, these people are not people. These are not humans. They're angels. Maybe we can just forget about them." It was an amazing thing that the Nazi himself was seized with a pad and a moa. Of course, his superior conquered that. And of course, they were a machine gun. They were massacred. Butler writes that that's also an aspect of koshim. the way you meet your fate, accepting God's will without complaint, accepting God's will with serenity and calmness. Now again, that still doesn't explain every holocaust scenario. So there actually is a reference in eerashem as a very side reference where some interpret the language is ambiguous. I have to be honest that the Rambam also maintains in addition to the kinesem and that we've already talked about anyone who is killed because he is a Jewish person is keshm meaning the fact that you were singled out because you're Jewish. Oh, obviously if uh a Jewish person gets killed in an automobile accident, that would not be called dying al-Qashem. Person just died. Okay. Uh but if a person is killed because they're Jewish, which of course was the Holocaust. And one could actually say it's the same thing with I mean there are non-Jewish soldiers in the army, but by and large the wars against the state of Israel are wars against the Jews. So that's a very interesting definition because according to that it makes no difference religious non-religious it makes no difference choice or not choice the very fact that somebody was killed because they are Jewish or were Jewish in itself may constitute a keshm which is an interesting point about the holocaust that which is why we say they they are considered to be martyrs ales but as I say um the the underlying logic lo of that is not is not as clear as one would hope and the Rambam's language is also not as clear as one would hope but this is I'm sure you probably have heard this this is actually a common paraphrase of the Rambam's view that he who dies because they're Jewish died alashm now I will say this uh in the case of a there may be something better than a Holocaust survivor and I don't mean a survivor and a holocaust victim because the actively is giving his life to help the Jewish people in Eric. No, that that is not just he got killed because he's a Jew. He got killed in the course of being Moser nephesh for Ami Israel. There I think you actually do have a stronger strong case that that is called Hashem because of that devotion to to Ami Israel. Um I've mentioned before forgive me for repeating that Orbach uh who lived in Shahed but his yeshiva Ktora is in Bayan. So he once encountered one of his toidim who was going up to Tvat to Davin by the kra sadikim the kev of the Arizal rabio karo you know all the if you ever been to the great ancient cemetery ofat all sorts of great great great people are in that cemetery and he wanted to davin by their kev and it's right next to me is right across the valley and said to him why do you have to shle step all the way to Davin by the grave of Sadikim. Uh we're right in Bayan. We can go to Harzel. We can go to when it says when I need to dab in by the grave of Sadikim, I just go to the military cemetery on Mount Herzel and I dab in by the Kev of who gave his life alashm for Israel and those are considered to be sadikim that one can dav by again of course you're not praying to the but whatever the union of isman said it is now there are two versions to the story. I can't be ma version one is even if the was not a shabas version two shabas okay as I say I I don't know which story uh was accurate but still the idea that was nephashem u in a way is even more plausible than holocaust survivor meaning the holocaust survivor you have the issue that they were victims they didn't have choice the kayal you know is affirmatively making decisions uh for the benefit of the of the of the Jewish people. So uh this is again a little bit of of of controversy. Of course um this reminds me a little bit of a very famous remark attributed not attributed that Salvatri said Yoseph Dovetric said he was asked about uh the significance of the Israeli flag. you know some shors even init they actually like to have an Israeli flag a U United States flag let's say in America and an Israeli flag so first of all had a little bit of an ambivalent attitude he actually did not like uh what you might call ceremonies that were outside of the framework of he didn't like uh flags he didn't like um anything that was not part of the ms so he was not uh excited about the flag but he did Today there was something very significant in the Israeli flag in the following way. Uh we know that when a person dies we do a tahara we wash the body and that includes washing off blood. Let me just put this back on. Uh, you know, cleaning the body. But it's brought down that if a person died alkashem, a person, let's say was killed by a terrorist or or whatever, we actually keep the bloody clothes on him. We keep and even though we put on we put on top of the bloody clothes so that those bloody clothes of martyrdom should kind of be seen by Hashem and it'll be a source of divine memory and eventual retribution uh for the murders of people who died because they were Jewish. Sovietic said if the bloody clothes of the martyr are said to be a memory whatever that means exactly a memory to God of the evil that was perpetrated then the flag of the state of Israel is a reminder so to speak of all of the Jewish blood that has been shed and therefore it does have a certain spiritual significance because it recounts s to Hashem. Again, whatever that means exactly, but it is a symbolic recounting to of the sacrifices of the Jewish people. Now, again, we're actually living through this, you know, since um October 7, 2023. And now a new a new offensive, a new aggressive offensive in Gaza. Uh are, you know, people are dying, hostages are still at risk. So uh we hope that Hashem will look at the Israeli flag as Rafelik said and see uh the deaths of the Jewish people and uh their sacrifices and may it be a source of source of rah. But as I say the of the Rambam that martyrdom gets folded intoem and failure to give your life is actually aish because once again I want to emphasize itself does not create the duty of martyrdom because after all for shabases will override that does not create the duty of martyrdom but once we define that duty by other sources it'll be folded into the definition of okay. So when is there a duty of martyrdom? So as we said last week and as you know generally there are only three aos for which a person must give his life before he succumbs. Uh we call them the big three or the gimluros, right? Gimlamuros, shalos and they are they are idolatry umos uh sexual immorality andim and murder of the innocent as opposed to the rode which of course you can kill but killing an innocent person to save a life uh is not going to be permitted. And for Shabaser, the isore transgress and do not allow yourself to be killed. But for the giml, the claw is vial. You must must give up your life rather than transgress. And once again the Rambam says, "And if you give up your life, you are mad ate." Right? This is where he folds it in. If you lack the courage to give up your life, you are a hashem. Now the Rambam then goes further. Uh there are a few points about this. So for everything else transgress for nephesh for the big three you must give your life. Now what if a person is so committed to the mitzvot that he wants to give his life before he transgresses anything. Let's assume that someone goes over to him and says violate shabas or I'll kill you. Now the is you violate chabas. But what if he loves the Torah so much that he wants to die even for other transgressions? He would rather die than violate chabas. He would rather die than eat. Is there a concept of voluntary martyrdom when the Tyra does not obligate you to give your life? So the shittas is very interesting. The Rambam categorically rejects voluntary martyrdom. When the Tyra does not obligate you to give up your life, you are not allowed to give up your life. And if you give up your life, when the Tyra does not obligate you, you are a suicide who has committed a very very grave sin. So according to the Rambam, there's never a middle way. There is either an obligation to give up your life for the big three and other things I'll talk about in a few moments or there is a prohibition to give up your life for everything else. So the Rambam rejects what we might call voluntary martyrdom. However, I I have to say that the overall context of Jewish history actually rejects this ruling of the Rambam. And indeed, we have countless countless cases of people who did indeed give their life rather than transgress uh the Torah even when they were not obligated to do so. So, this issue about voluntary martyrdom uh is interesting. Now I want to point out uh an interesting point that I've already mentioned more than once and I'm going to mention it again as we go through this uh Rabbi Dr. Professor Khim Salvichek's series of essays on the myar kiteshm uh in which he actually argues that the myar keshm uh is uh is a work of rhetoric and not a pure work of haka because there are many statements in the mimemer keshm which contradict the final halaka as codified in the ram zone mishna. Torah written many years later. Now we do have to say the mere fact that uh the minm contradicts the Mishna Torah does not indicate it was not an accurate statement of I mean the Garrett Meshm was written when the Rambam was 27. The Mishna Torah was completed when the Rambam was 45. If there are inconsistencies that's not necessarily because the Raman was covering up. It could be that he changed his mind over the course of years. But one of the very interesting dichotoies is that precisely in my kites where the Rambam concludes that the people did not have to give up their lives before they profess Islam. The Rambam says, "But if you wanted to do so, you could do so." And that would be called a keshm. Now that that is a direct contradiction to what he says in perheatra in the Mishna Torah where the Rambam rejects voluntary martyrdom. So because of this Rafol draws the following conclusion really the Rambam held they should have given their lives as well. He didn't want to say it that would have been too hard of a standard. So instead he said if you're up to it because if indeed the Rambam seriously maintained there was no obligation to give up your life in the uh in the uh Moroccan situation then he wouldn't have allowed voluntarily giving up your life. So if he allows voluntarily giving up your life, uh, Professor Salvetric suggests he actually maintains your to give up your life. But he didn't want to he didn't want to go that far. That that's why he called it an act of rhetoric, an act of comfort, an act of a letter of, but not necessarily a definitive ruling. Again though in the Mishna Torah the Rambam says categorically there is no such thing as voluntary martyrdom. Now this comes up a lot in terms of volunteerism. Uh uh can a person right the surround a city and the say give us a Jew to kill or we will wipe out the whole city. So the is clear that we are not allowed to pick a Jew and send him out even if that means the whole city is going to be wiped out because the rule that you can't murder or cause murder to save lives even means if you're saving a lot of lives it's not a onetoone it's we don't do a numbers game so the question people ask is could a person volunteer could a person say I will give my life so the city will be saved or what about the person who jumps on a grenade to save other people. Now the question becomes if the Rambam says when there's not an obligation to give your life, you're not allowed to do so. So is this person god forbid a sinner? We would hate to to envision him that way. So uh interesting question perhaps according to the Rambam you're not allowed to do that but the counterargument is that in cases like jumping on the grenade or in cases like volunteering the person's going to die anyway meaning meaning if he doesn't volunteer if he doesn't jump on the grenade everybody's going to probably get killed. So that's a little different meaning you're not talking about a person who would otherwise live who volunteers to give up his life. You're talking about a person who would die with everybody else, but he's willing to step forward to save everybody else. So it might be in that particular case, the Rambam would allow a voluntary martyrdom. But in cases where some just some innocent person just comes forward and says take me instead of him. At least according to the Rambam, uh that would not be permitted. But as I say the flow of Jewish history has not followed the Rambam on that point. In fact I believe they said by the Greb uh one of many stories that uh the Grebby was uh the rebi of the largest in Poland. G was super uh in terms of numbers the very very large in Poland and uh the Germans considered the Greb like the the the rabbi of the Jews of Poland. So they were looking for the Grebby. The Gerbi who was who eventually smuggled out the Imra and got and got to Erit Israel. But he was very very high on the list. And at one point uh the Nazis actually got to the home where the Rebi was hiding and they said, "Where is the rabbi?" And uh Shi with a big white beard stepped forward and said, "I am the rabbi." and they shot him dead immediately. Essentially what he did was he impersonated he said he was the gerba so they would kill him rather than look for the reb. So again uh you could describe this in different ways. You could say this was a suicide or you could say this was an altruistic act of rescue to rescue a great great sighting. So it seems that just literally that the Rambam might not have approved of that. The Rambam would not have approved of giving up your life to save another person because the Rambam says martyrdom is either an obligation or a prohibition and there's certainly no obligation to give your life to save somebody else. On the other hand, I'll repeat that Jewish history has not followed the Rambam and there are many many many instances of people voluntarily giving their lives uh to save uh other people whether it be your own children or whether it just be it sadic or or or whatever it is but nevertheless that is the Rambam's view that there is no concept of voluntary martyrdom. Now let's go further. What if a person was supposed to give up his life? Right? The Crusades, the non-Jew says, "Bow down to the idol or I'll kill you." The response is, "Give up my life. Die." What if I didn't? What if I did bow down to the idol? What if I did convert to Christianity, at least externally? Uh, Morados, uh, Jews professed, uh, faith uh, in Christianity even though they kept the Torah privately. So here's what the Rambam says an interesting point and this is even true with murder whether it's aodiz whether it's a sexual a murdered somebody to save your life which you're not allowed to do. So here the Ramba makes a very interesting distinction between before the fact and after the fact. Before the fact, if you ask a shila, should I bow down to the idol or die? The answer is die. Should I rape this woman or die? The answer is die. Should I murder this person to save my life? The answer is no. Die. But once you did it, the Rambam says the following. Any act that was done under coercion or fear of death is not legally punishable. So if you murdered an innocent person to save your life, you would not get any penalty on the part of a baston. Right? If you worshiped a bodhisora, again your only sin, which is a serious sin, is you desecrated God's name by failing to give your life. So you're over there on Hashem, which is bad. Very, very bad. But you're technically not an idoltor and you're not a murderer. You're not a rapist. Because the Rambam says even though you should have given your life, you acted under duress. You acted under compulsion because you acted because fear fear for your life. Now this itself is very important in the mamarashm scenario because what it's saying is the following. Even if they should have given up their lives which the Ramba maintains they didn't have to and we'll get to that. After the fact they're still Jews in good standing unlike what that rabbi told them that their mitzvah don't count. So this is an extremely important distinction the Ramba makes between before the fact and after the fact. And the Ramba maintains that after the fact there is no punishment that is attaching to them because they are called anusim. They are called people who were forced into it by virtue of compulsion. But here we do have a very very fascinating contradiction in the Rambam which he does not raise in this letter but it's raised in the Mishna Torah. So I'm going to mention it and that is the following. The Rambam says the same rules that apply when a guy goes over to me and says do this sinner I'll kill you will also apply in the case of illness. Let's assume that a person is ill. person is dying and the only way he could save his life, let's imagine, is by drinking some fresh human blood by killing somebody. Yeah. Again, you I I I can't really make up a realistic case for something like that. So, the Rambam says the same way you can't murder in response to a non-Jew threatening you, you can't do it to save yourself from illness. So, for sure overrides but the big three you cannot do even to save your life in the case of but here the Rambam says the follow the following idea if a person violated the big three in order to save his life from a uh from a fatal illness there he would actually get punished for his sin after the fact. Damba is malik between a person who acts under the duress of a of another person versus a person who acts under the duress of an illness which will save him. Uh so an example would be uh you're not allowed to get benefit from idolatry, right? Uh if you have an idolatrous tree, you're not allowed to get benefit from it and that's called a votor itself just getting benefit. So if this tree would have medicinal properties, you would not be allowed to use the tree even to save your life. But the Rambam says if you did use the tree, you would be of misa after the fact for so this is a very famous question. What is the difference between and coercion? Meaning if a says to me bow down to this idol or I'll kill you, I must die. But if I didn't die, I don't get punished because I acted under duress. Now, if I'm faced with a situation, use this idolatrist tree for medical reasons or you will die. Once again, I'm supposed to die, but if I use the tree, I will be guilty of a lot. And if witnesses warned me not to do it, I would get the death penalty. So what is the nafkamina? What is the difference between holi sickness and coercion on the part of a third a third person? So it's it's a famous question. It's a well-known steer a well-known contradiction uh in uh in the Rambam's words. But the arsame or meim of dinsk does offer a distinction and he says in the case of the non-Jewish oppressor by the it could be a Jewish oppressor too. I mean always uses non-Jewish oppressors because it could not envision a Jewish person doing it. But you know there's no difference here if the oppressor is Jewish or non-Jewish who says to me bow down to the idol or I'll kill you. So his will is being superimposed on my will. So as a result, my decision to bow down to an idol in order not to endanger my life is a coercion that overpowers my will and therefore even though before the fact I should have given my life to be sure but after the fact I don't get punished. In the case of the ki the sickness itself is not pushing you in a certain direction. It's your decision that you want to heal your sickness by taking this idolatous treatment. But there's no direct imposition on your will. Okay, it's a subtle distinction uh just to be aware of it. I don't want to be mar in it uh in it uh too much. Okay. So, so far I've only mentioned three cases where you have to give your life a gilat. But now we have to go a little further. The Rambam and again the Rambam didn't make this up. This is all based on Tmudic discussion. The Rambam then goes on and says there are times you must give your life even for other things. And he says the following. He says if the sin is going to be committed publicly and publicly is defined not necessarily in such a large audience in front of at least 10 Jews that's called publicly there's a minion and the goy's motivation see there there are two types of motivations here when someone tells me let's take shabas. Someone says, "Mow the lawn or I'll kill you." Now, there might be two different reasons why he says, "Mow the lawn or I'll kill you." One reason might be he has nothing to do with chabas and nothing to do with fkat. He just wants the lawn mowed and he's a crazy guy. He's going to kill me if I don't mow the lawn. Meaning he's not doing it because he wants me to transgress my religion. He's doing it because he wants me to mow the lawn. That is a category that is called hanoas atmo. That he's not doing it to take me away from the Torah. He's doing it for his own benefit. That's one motive. A second motive is alastically to wean me away from my religious observance. So here is what the Rambam says. If let's again I I I I do want to apologize to the uh Gentiles of the world. I I keep on using the example of a but again I'm not suggesting that all goyam do this and I'm not suggesting that the would be different for a Jew. I'm just using the as the example that is in rabbitic literature including the Rambam. Uh so apologies to the non-Jews of the world if if any of them are listening. Uh, so we have a situation. The guy goes over to me and says, "Mo that lawn or I'll kill you." And he does it to me. He says it to me where 10 Jews are watching. 10 Jews are watching. So the Rambam says, "It depends on what the motivation is. If the motivation is ho, he's not telling me to mow the lawn because he wants me to violate the Torah. He's telling me to mow the lawn because he wants that lawn mowed or he'll kill me, a crazy king. So there the Rambam says, "We do apply Pikuak even publicly and go ahead and mow the lawn." But says the Ramba, no two conditions here. If the Ara is going to be public, public and the motivation is specifically geared to my repudiation of the Torah. Note the two conditions public and alas. So in such a situation, the duty of martyrdom applies to every single mitzvah of the Torah, no matter how small that would be. Okay? It's not only shabas, you know, shabas is a serious violation, but even something like uh if you put on fill in, I'm going to kill you. uh or the tom says even min that are not evenly valid. The Gmorrah gives a case of a shoelace. Let's assume that there was a min that Jewish people wore red shoelac uh black shoelaces and the umam wore red shoelaces and the government decrees all Jews must wear red shoelaces or they will be killed. The Gomorrah says, "If the purpose of the gazer was simply a narish kite, we want everybody to dress the same, that's fine. Go go to red shoelaces. But if the intention is to wean Jews away from their religious observance by creating assimilation, even changing a shoelace is yehore vial yavir." Now, now an example of this actually was in the 19th century in Galitzia. Some of you might uh have family from Galitzia. My my own parents are from Galitzia. So, Galitzia was uh Polish, Austrian, German borders, etc. And Galitzia had two opposite trends. It's very interesting. Two opposite trends in the 19th century. It was a very very heavily part of Poland but also it had tremendous huskala at the same time. So you had opposite forces. You had many many many muskilm and you had many many many and unfortunately the muskilim and this is kind of a badge of shame uh very much wanted to crush the they were constantly making accusations against the communities to the government of disloyalty and everything else and therefore a lot of the government's negative responses to came from accusations of the musk now again um we can be an even opportunity condemmer. I mean kind of hit back with some shots of their own. It was very very nasty. People Jews were attacking each other and going to the government kind of like what people do today in building. Someone wants to build somewhere and people are always reporting to the and everything else. Uh so here is the thing at some point the government in Galitzia which was part of the AustriaHung Hungary Hungarian Empire wanted to prohibitim from dressing in their distinctive way. They can't wear strimmls. Of course, original originally strimml were in fact the head of Polish nobility originally, but by the 19th century it did become a distinctively shaush and they actually declared Jews cannot dress in garb. It was against the law. So the kidic rebies of Poland actually Pascans yeare vavar they must even be willing to die before they change their lavush. Now I understand when you first hear that that sounds very very extreme but in point of fact it seems to exactly be what the Rambam is saying based on the Gmorrah that when the of the oppressor is not for his convenience but it's then there's going to be to give your life even on a minor thing like the distinctively Jewish lab I think it is fairly clear uh that the motive of the government was to take people away from at least traditional Judaism that might be laad now it gets a little complicated the reason why it gets a little complicated is the muskilum wouldn't describe it as that the muskila might say oh we're not trying to take you away from Judaism we just want you to have a more modern type of Juda I mean see it's a little semantic it's not we it's not that we want to take you away from Torah. We want to take you away from the excesses of So that's an interesting question. Is that in Allah does? Okay. So the point is though based on this ruling you actually see that the duty of martyrdom can potentially be much much broader than the big three. So now let me ask you a simple question. Let's consider a concentration camp. So, uh, Jews often had to work on Shabas, and if they wouldn't work on Shabas. If they refused to work on Shabas, they would be killed. Uh, they were served uh non-coosher food. Uh, if they would refuse to take it, they might be killed even then, besides starving to death or the like. So here's the question and again I I hate to talk about this in theoretical sense because real real people suffered real pain. So of course we have to feel their pain and feel their Rahmanas. But just to analyze this academically, um, if a Nazi told told someone, "Get this job done. Operate this sewing, it's shabas, operate the sewing machine or I'm going to kill you." Would we tell the person what would the Rav say and there were Rabanim in the concentration camp who passen people would ask about him? Would the Ra say work work work work it's neesh don't deseesecrate shabas so they shouldn't kill you uh that's one approach or would we say that if the goal of Nazism was to take Jews away from the Torah and there were 10 Jews present would we say you have to give your life now I will tell you as a matter of historical record that was given by every post I'm aware of was piku people were told to work on chabas people were told to eat even though some of the rabbis who gave them that they themselves did not eat that was their thing but they gave a ha to other people so the bottom line was that people had rabbitic that they must violate chabas and they must violate kash. The question I'm going to leave you with is I I I get but what about this rule that where the motivation of the oppressor is to take you away from your religion and it's done in front of 10 Jews. You are muy to give up your life even beyond the big three even for Shabas even for minhagen but for for shabas meaning was Nazi Germany or or not was Nazism was the were the concentration camps an example of laavro alhadas it's actually a little confusing it's not so easy and again I I hate to be so academic here but it's not so easy to characterize uh Nazism as laadas because the Nazis were not interested in converting us. The Nazis were interested in extinguishing us. So you could actually say their motive was not to take us away from Judaism. Their motive was just to kill us. And therefore Pikuak nephesh would still work. On the other hand, that's not quite true. Although it's true that Nazism was not trying to convert us, but part of the extermination plan was to demoralize us by taking us away from the Torah that gave us a certain amount of comfort. Meaning, when a Nazi said, "Ooperate that sewing machine on Shabas," they weren't indifferent to the fact that it was Shabas. there was something part of their diabolical plan that it be on Shabas. So that's the issue. Uh if the crazy king doesn't even know it's Shabas and tells you to mow the lawn, that's a pure hanatmo and mow the lawn on Shabas. But here I think there was a mixed motive. Yeah, they were going to exterminate us anyway, but I think there was a plan to wean us away from the Torah and the mitzvah. So I'm going to leave it as a question. Well, we'll we'll talk more about this next week. uh but the point I wanted to introduce today was a very important point that the duty of martyrdom can and does extend beyond the big three. uh when you have a combination of two conditions public in front of 10 Jews and the motive is rather than so if it's private then even if the motive is to take me away from religion it's mutar and if it's public and the motive is that um for convenience of the guy it's also mutar you have to have two conditions Bifaria and Laas and the question I'm leaving for your cogitation is whether Nazism would qualify as laad or because since it was a pure extermination system uh we don't treat that in that in that manner. Okay. Uh we will continue uh next week uh because again uh the Rambam does have to deal with this particular schmod uh that was going on. Uh yeah.