Hashem is One - Rabbi Dr. David Gottlieb

I think we have a picture of it. In fact, it seems so well known and so natural that we take it for granted. And then when something provokes us to think about it, to push a little bit, it can sort of go to pieces right in front of you and you realize wow. Things like that suffer from what someone called over familiarity. They're so familiar that you just assume that they don't have to be extreme and thought about. Here's one. I don't remember whether you were here when I discussed this. I've discussed this so often in the last few years. We have the Shema. Here, oh Israel, Hashem our God, Hashem is one. And we take that to be the statement of Jewish monotheism. Right? Let me ask a very simple I'm not going to You don't have to look it up because I'm not going to any further than those six words. Um let me ask a very outlandish question. Let's imagine a person who lived in ancient Greece. Unless he believed in the ancient Greek religion, which has 14 gods or 26 gods or 107 gods, I don't know, gods, goddesses. Now, imagine him saying, "Zeus is one." Zeus is one. From his point of view, from the point of view of his religion, is that true or false? Well, I mean that guy I guess it really means on what he's intending to say by it. Okay. Zeus is the name of the chief god, right? And he's And he means to say that Zeus is one. He's one. I mean, technically that statement would be true in the sense I mean like he is one god. Yeah, he's he's one, not three, not a committee. Zeus isn't the name of a committee. Zeus is the name of one god. Right? Yeah. So now, this ancient Greek says Zeus is one. That doesn't make him a monotheist because he'll tell you, "Sure, Zeus is one of the many gods. He's one, but there are other ones." That's quite reasonable. So how is it that when we say Hashem is one, that makes us monotheists? Maybe all it says is Hashem is one of the many gods. How does saying Hashem is one make us monotheists? I think that's awful. That's awful. What? The classic statement of monotheism for 3,300 years doesn't really commit us to there being only one god? I think that's a disaster. Now, the way in which the tradition explains the Shema, cabalistic tradition, philosophical tradition, there are ways out. But the first thing to notice is that there's a problem here. In fact, I'm not recommending this, but if you look into the people who think of themselves as critical and independent minded and historical and so forth and so on, they will tell you that there are really three positions. There's monotheism, polytheism, which believes in many gods, and henotheism. theism h e n o theism Henotheism says, "We pledge allegiance to this one and only god." Are there other gods? We are not prejudiced one way or the other. There may be, there may be not. We don't care. Even if there are, we pledge allegiance to only one god. And they have tried to uh insinuate that maybe the Shema is only a statement of henotheism. It just means that this group dedicates itself to this one god without prejudice as to whether there are other gods. Which again would mean that it's not a statement of monotheism. Now, the question is how do do better than that? After all, Judaism is monotheistic and this has been understood as a statement of monotheism. So how how how can we get more out of the words than we seem to be getting? Is the problem clear? Yeah. Okay. Now, as I said, the cabalistic tradition and philosophical tradition do this in spades, but they are long, complex, subtle. I want to suggest something simpler, much simpler, much more direct, which I think is also true. Um Hashem, h e s h e m, is what we use in place of the four-letter name of God. When a person uses a name, speaking, and he uses a name, um almost always he uses the name to talk about the thing. But that's not always true. Sometimes you use the name to talk about the qualities of the thing, not the thing itself, but its qualities. Suppose I want to stress that a certain writer or a certain athlete was unique. He's unique. I might say, "There's only one." There's only one Shakespeare. I don't mean in the history of mankind there's only one person whose name Shakespeare. That's probably true, but that's trivial. It's obvious. Dumb. What I mean is think of all the writers in the English language. None of them can compare to Shakespeare. None of them has qualities like those of Shakespeare. And by contrast, I might say there are lots of Charles Dickens's. Charles Dickens was talented, but there are other equally talented writers. There's only one Shakespeare. When I say that, I'm not talking about the flesh and blood person Shakespeare. I'm talking about his literary qualities. You're probably too young to remember this, but maybe 10 years ago there was a great Jewish athlete, a swimmer, named Mark Spitz, who won five gold medals in one Olympic competition. That was a colossal. A person could say there are lots of good swimmers, there are lots of good athletes, there's only one Mark Spitz. If I say there's only one Mark Spitz, I'm not saying no family Spitz will ever name their child Mark again. That's clearly dumb. They'll do it lots of times. I mean, look at the the the athletic qualities that Mark Spitz had. No other athlete will ever have those qualities. So sometimes when you use a name, you use a name to talk about not the thing itself, but the qualities of the thing. And when you say he's one, there's only one, what you're saying is there's only one that has those qualities. This one has those qualities and nothing else has those qualities. Let's try that out. Let's see if we can't use that kind of understanding to give uh content to the Shema that will have express monotheism. So let's see. We're using the name Hashem, yud kay vav kay. What qualities are associated with that name? Well, as the Ramban points out, that name is built on a root hay vav hay, which connotes existence. One way to explain the name is necessary existence. Existing absolutely. Existing only because of itself, not because of anything else. That's a quality. How many things have that quality? That they exist absolutely, necessarily, only because of themselves, not because of anything else? It's not obvious. In philosophy, there are lots of candidates to have that kind of quality. Numbers, propositions, quality and characteristics, which would mean there's infinity of them. Now, the Shema says, "This quality of absolute, necessary, independent existence is had by only one." It's had by only one. If philosophy is wrong, there's only one that has that quality. Since there are other points of view in which there are many things that have that quality, to be told there's only one thing that has that quality is news. Could have been wrong. For all we know, could have been wrong. And it turns out that the Torah says that it's right. Now, let's just follow out the implication. If there's only one thing that has absolute, necessary, independent existence, what kind of existence do all the other things All the other things have contingent contingent means didn't have to be dependent existence. Okay. So, let's see. Here's a chicken. Why does that chicken exist? Because it was an egg. And that egg came from a previous pair of chickens and chicken egg, chicken egg, chicken egg. So, that this chicken exists is because of a chain of chickens and eggs. Didn't always exist, didn't have to exist. Somebody had killed prior generation chickens earlier, it wouldn't have existed. It has contingent um contingent dependent existence. Now, if everything has contingent dependent existence, you ask why does this exist? It exists because of something else. Now, trace that chain back. Eventually, that chain is going to end up in the one thing that has necessary absolute independent existence. That being stands at the top of all the chains. That being stands at the top of all the chains comes out that that being is the creator of everything else. Cuz it gives existence to everything else. Okay. So, now it seems to me when we say there's only one thing that has absolute necessary independent existence, we are saying that there is a creator. A single creator of everything. That sounds like monotheism. If you build that concept into the idea of the name and you understand the the the Shema as saying there's only one thing that has the qualities that are associated with that name, then the result is you are saying that there's a creator. As a being that created everything else. That sounds like monotheism. I think using that strategy you can see that the Shema talks about monotheism. Okay? All right. Um Now, the Kabbalistic tradition does it, as I said, the Kabbalistic and philosophical traditions do it in a more sophisticated way. Kabbalistic tradition says that when we say that Hashem is one, we say that only his will lies behind everything that exists and everything that happens. There's no competition for Hashem. His will lies behind everything and although things look different, things look contradictory, things look as if they don't express one plan or one single value or one single future, that's only a false appearance. Whether it's the things that exist or the events that happen in the world, they all have one will behind them. Even human beings, when human beings make free choices, God's will is behind their existence and their ability to make those free choices. And although human being making free choice might do something that God would prefer not to happen, but God wants it to have the free choice. Be able to make the free choice. Now, if God's will is the only will that's being expressed in all of the creation in terms of the existence and the events that take place in the creation, then that's clearly monotheism. It's monotheism without a without a doubt. Maimonides who is with you others say that the oneness that's expressed in the Shema has a difference uh again, it's not competition, it's a complimentary idea. A different connotation. Connotation is that there's that God is one in every dimension, in every respect, in every application, in every connection. The only number that could apply to God what I'm saying now would need further refinement, but I'm saying this way for the moment. The only number that could apply to God is one. No number other than one could apply to God. Now, let's see what that implies. Maimonides says immediately it implies that God can't be a physical object. First of all, because almost all physical objects have parts. And that would mean that the number of parts would be another number other than one that would apply to that thing. If you imagine something that doesn't have parts, which today in terms of modern science, we do imagine. Maimonides does consider that possibility. Then he he says at least every physical thing has matter and form. Having matter and form means that it's a at least a duality. Even if you can't chop it up into pieces, but it has two aspects which can't be avoided. And therefore, a number other than one applies to God. To that thing. And therefore, it can't be God. So, God can't be a physical object. Okay. So, I say God isn't a physical object. Um In Maimonides' picture of the world, angels are not physical objects, either. They don't have mass or substance. They don't have sorry? They don't have mass or substance. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. Angels, according to God and Maimonides, are pure form. They have no substance or matter or material at all. Pure form. This is one of the ways in which he disagrees with Aristotle. So, why aren't angels God? Because Maimonides pushes this idea that the only number that could apply to God is one to another dimension. And that is the dimension of qualities or characteristics. Does God have qualities or characteristics? So, naively we say, "Sure. God is all powerful and God is all knowing and God is just and God is kind. God is merciful." That's five. Should we keep going? So, you're going to have a number of qualities that characteristics of God. Well, Maimonides comes marching back in and says, "Excuse me, I told you the only number that could possibly apply to God is one. And if you have five qualities, then it's wrong." And don't tell me, says Maimonides, this is part one, chapter 15 in the guide. Don't tell me this this all knowing and all powerful and just and merciful and kind, those are different qualities in people. Cuz people live on a much lower level. But in God, those different qualities are one. So, there is only one. If you tell me that, says Maimonides, then I think you are identical to a Christian. What do the Christians say? Christians say that God is three and one, one and three, cuz three is one and one is three. And Maimonides says, "People who say that sound like people who are interested in what syllables to pronounce, but have no care for the idea behind the words that they're saying. Because there is no such idea that one is three and three is one. That's an open contradiction and it's nonsensical. And a Jew who says, "Of course, there are many qualities, but in God, the many qualities are one." is saying they're many and one and one and many. And that's just ridiculous. So, the conclusion says my says Maimonides, this part one, chapters 53 to 60 in the guide, is that God doesn't have qualities. Doesn't have any qualities. Now, I'm going to call in an IOU. I said before a couple of times that the only number that could possibly apply to God is one. Could possibly. But in the end, Maimonides says God isn't one, either. Cuz that's a quality. Indeed, says Maimonides, you can't even say that God exists. Cuz that's also a quality. You can't talk about God at all. Can't say anything about God. And all the talk that we have about God is not talk about what God is, it's talk about what God does. It's all talk about his actions, not not not about what he is. Now, take all that on board and ask, could there be more than one? For there to be more than one, you have to have qualities to distinguish them. When you have if you have a physical object, a physical object can be in a place. So, then you can have two pencils that are equally sharp and equally long and equally yellow and equally wood and equal equal mass and equal volume and so on and so on. Just that one is in Ohio, one is in in the Nebraska. So, that's what makes them different. When you have something that physical, the only way you can distinguish it is by its qualities. Angels are distinguished by their qualities, by what they do. If you have two things, you say, "Okay, there are two things. There are no qualities at all." There's nothing to make them two. That's what the Shema says. Says, "Hashem is one." It means first to deny any number other than one. Once you deny any number other than one, you see that you're out of the characteristics of things that we can describe altogether. You end up then saying that it has no description, no qualities. Which then goes back on the one and takes the one as just negative. Nothing other than one. And then you end up with that. There certainly can't be more. There certainly can't be multi- multiplicity. You can't say positively that it's one, but you certainly can't say that it's two or more. And that's what you're left with in terms of monotheism. So, that's that's the philosophical treatment. Now, we have to appreciate that they don't contradict one another, but the capitalists also agree that God is not describable. The cabalistic explanation of one was his will underlies everything. But that's not talking about what he is. That will is talking about what he does. And I I just want to finish with a description of what this means. When we talk about what he does, sometimes this comes I I talk about this all the time, but I don't get a chance to elaborate it. Mhm? That's describing what he does. That's right. That's part of one chapter 54 in the Guide for the Perplexed, right? It's a It's a great thing to read about six times. Yes, Guide for the Perplexed, right. Now, when you talk about what he does, let's just stop and think for a moment about the difference between an event that happens on the one hand and an action. What's the difference between an event that happens and an action? Let's make it very close. A person trips over something and stumbles and falls. We don't say that was an action of his. It's something that happened to him. Or a person has a twitch. Again, that's not an action, something happens to him. What's the difference between tripping over something and stumbling and falling on the one hand, and the other hand, the chassan standing under the chuppah, and they put the wrapped glass under his feet, and he stamps on the glass and smashes the glass. Everyone says, "Mazel tov! You're married!" What's the difference? The difference is that an action is the result of a will. An action has a purpose. And usually, maybe always, depending on how you describe it, an action has a choice of a means by which to achieve the purpose. An action has in it three elements which are missing from a mere event. So, let's consider a case with an action. The chassan steps on the glass and breaks the glass. Or someone waves his hand like this. So, it's always relevant to ask, "What was your purpose in doing that?" That's always relevant. A person that says, "Purpose? What are you talking about? Purpose doesn't come into it." That convicts it of not being an action. If it's an action, it's something that was done for a purpose. It was The will chose it for a purpose. Now, let's be careful. The purpose doesn't have to be something different from the action. That it doesn't have to be. Person waving his hand, "What was your purpose in waving your hand?" "My purpose was to wave my hand." That's perfectly okay. Might be. He just felt like waving his hand. And he waved his hand. That's an application of the concept of purpose. It just doesn't have to be something else as a purpose. But there always has to be a purpose. And usually, if the if he says, "I was waving my hand in order to alert the spy across the street, to send him a signal." So then, you can ask, "Well, why was that your means of alerting the spy? Why didn't you some other way of alerting the spy?" And usually, maybe always, there's some calculation, or we we um we set it up as a as a code. And then he was waiting for my wave, you know? One if by land, two if by sea, you know? Uh or you could say, "Look, this The planned communication was an SMS, and my phone is broken. It's the best I can do. You know, he'll see me waving, and I hope he'll understand what it is that I mean to convey to him, though I'm not sure I'm going to be successful." But whenever there is an action where the action is for the sake of a purpose, and what you do is a means to the purpose, then there's a calculation how you decided on this means for that for that purpose to be achieved. That's the difference between an action and a mere event that happens. Now, that's very very important because when the Sforno, the the Rambam, and the Ralbag, and all the others say, "We describe God's actions." You have to realize that describing his actions includes all of this. So, if I'm describing his actions, that means I'm going to know something about his purposes. Because you don't understand it as an action unless you know the purpose for which it was done. And God indeed tells us what his purposes are, to a great extent. And where the action takes place at one time, and the purpose is something else, then there's usually some understanding of the calculation as to why that had to happen. So, the Jewish people were slaves in Egypt, and slaves in Egypt in order to prepare them for the revelation at Sinai. What did the experience in Egypt contribute to their ability to stand at Sinai? That's a relevant question. And our literature answers that the Jews had to overcome the effects of the sin in the Garden of Eden, which caused the degradation of mankind, the pollution of mankind. To stand at Sinai, that had to be overcome. And the slavery in Egypt served that purpose. To say, "Okay, so now I know. The purpose of the slavery in Egypt was for the sake of standing at Sinai. And the reason that was chosen rather than spending 210 years in a garden, or on a picnic, or writing, you know, Sforno, is because that's the way in which the pollution of the Garden of Eden had to be overcome. That's what it means to describe God's actions. Without that understanding what an action is, the the phrase "describe God's actions" could sound very thin. Well, it happened and he did it. That's not describing God's action. That's describing an event and putting God's name on it. Describe God's action means describing the purpose and describing the choice of means for the sake of the purpose. That means you get a considerable amount of information about what's happening in the world. But that says nothing about the agent who's behind it. Let's take Maimonides' statement that we don't say that God exists. Don't say that God exists? How do we get along? Answer, if you you you can speak in a negative way, where all you say is negative about something else, and that carries to a certain extent what you intend by saying God exists. For example, I say, "This world doesn't exist on its own." This world is not self-sustaining, self- uh you know, it's not doesn't exist on its own. That's a negative statement. That's only a negative statement. That's okay. That's perfectly reasonable. I'm making a comment about the world. That it doesn't carry itself. Not self-sufficient. People talk about God being infinite. I think almost everybody who says God is infinite is saying nothing at all. They have no clue what they're saying. They have no concept of infinite. But if a person says, "Listen, when I say infinite, I mean what it literally says, in finite." In is just a way of saying not. I'm saying God is not finite. That's fine. That's fine. You have all these finite things, and God's not like that. Once you take it negatively, that's fine. Because you're denying something. You're not affirming something. You're not asserting something. Um and that's another way to talk. You can talk positively about God's actions, or you can talk negatively. And Maimonides has both of those in chapters 50 through 60. 57, 8, I think, where he talks about talking negatively. Those are both fine, but that's all there is. Reason for God, that's all there is. Um now, I'll explain to you, and then I'm going to quit. I'll just give you a little a little bit of background how this works. But just make it, I hope, less mysterious. We talk about things. Talk about things' qualities. A quality attaches to a category. The function of a quality is to describe things in a certain category. If you use a quality in the category, so then what you're saying makes sense. Might be true, might be false, but it makes sense. Take that quality, use it outside the category, it makes no sense at all. So, this table is brown. That's true. If I said this table is purple, it would make sense. Could have been purple. Maybe someday it will be purple. Somebody might paint it purple. It just doesn't have to be purple, so it's not true. The The quality purple, color qualities generally apply to physical objects. Now, suppose I say the number six is brown. That's cuckoo because numbers don't have qualities. They're colors. Numbers don't have colors. To use the a color term for numbers is to take it outside its category. And you end up with nonsense. And it works backwards also. All whole numbers are either even or odd. Is this table even or odd? The table. Answer is not even, it's not odd. Nonsensical. Talk about the number of parts of the table, you could do that, but that's something else. That's not the table, it's the number of its parts. Table is not even or odd. Even or and odd are qualities that apply to numbers, whole numbers in particular. And they don't apply to tables, they don't apply to fractions either. So, that being the case, each quality belongs to a category. And there's a number of different categories. Physical objects is one, and numbers is another, and concepts is another, and qualities themselves is a is a category. Another. And there may be more. Now, let's just notice that God isn't in any of those categories. God isn't a physical object. And God isn't a number. And God isn't a quality. And God isn't a concept. So, if God is outside all of our categories, then of course none of our descriptive terms is going to apply to him. Cuz each descriptive term is attached to a category. And even if you'll tell me that there are descriptive terms that aren't attached to a particular category, like exists, and people are inclined to say tables exist, and numbers exist, concepts exist, and qualities exist. That's true, but then exist just jumps from category to category. It just applies within all the categories. But it doesn't apply outside the categories. So, if God is outside all the categories, then even exist isn't going to apply to God. This is one way of seeing why all of our descriptions don't apply to God. And if you'll ask, "But what about the description of being outside all the categories?" That we'll take negatively. We'll just say, "What we're saying is he's not in this category, he's not in that category, he's not in that category, he's not in that category." Once you take it negatively, that's fine. That doesn't say anything positive about God at all. So, Maimonides concludes there are only two things to say about God. It's to talk about his actions and to speak negatively, which is really not to talk about God at all. And that's all That's all we have. God is beyond all description altogether. That's what Maimonides accomplishes in part one, chapters 53 through 60 in The Guide.